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Utah Code Ann. § 28-29-2(h) 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction to review this final decree of divorce pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 28-2a-2(h) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD REVIEW 
1. Should a divorcing spouse be entitled to more than a presumptive 50% 
share of marital property simply because the other spouse received non-marital gifts 
from his family? Standard of Review: A trial court is afforded considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption 
of validity. Thomas v. Thomas. 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
2. Should a trial court be allowed to dispose of loans and obligations 
involving third-parties, either as a creditor or debtor, and in so doing convert loans to 
gifts to a non-intended spouse, and create non-existent assets? Standard of Review: 
The appellate court will approve changes in the trial court's property distribution only if 
there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
prejudice, the evidence preponderates against the findings, or a serious inequity has 
resulted manifesting a clear abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), Finlavson v. Finlavson. 874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). On 
questions, however, of law the trial court is given no difference. 
3. Should a willing and capable spouse be required to work and support 
herself to the extent of full time employment, or, if not, should the court have imputed 
income based upon full time employment for purposes of calculating child support and 
alimony? Standard of Review: The trial court should make sufficiently detailed findings 
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on a spouse's needs, ability to support herself, and the paying spouse's ability to 
contribute to the receiving spouse. Standard of Review: abuse of discretion. Barnes v. 
Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
4. These issues encompass several related issues traditionally raised in 
reviewing divorce matters heard by the District Courts, which will be discussed infra. 
For example, on the issue of alimony, Respondent contends the court improperly 
allowed $1,100.00 in expenses more than it originally found, and had no competent in 
evidence in the record to do so. 
Preservation of Issues: 
Respondent preserved objections to the trial court's errors by filing timely 
objections (R. 687) and a Motion for New Trial (R. 754-792) (see Addendum). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(1) provides in pertinent part: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) provides: 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self 
employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and 
expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to 
the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses 
necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be 
deducted from gross receipts. 
Section (7)(d) provides: 
Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
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(i) the reasonable cost of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot 
earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish 
basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. This is an appeal of a Final Decree of Divorce entered in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, by the Honorable Raymund Uno. The parties were married on 
February 3,1978. Nineteen years later in January 1997, Tamra Chavez (hereinafter 
"Petitioner") filed for divorce. The parties reached an initial settlement agreement in 
June 1997, (R.104) many of the terms and conditions of which Respondent satisfied, 
however, the settlement was set aside on February 24, 1998, at Petitioner's request. 
On September 3, 1998, the Commissioner recommended a temporary order, which 
included a restraint from dissipating marital assets. (R.385). Thereafter the court 
entered a bifurcated decree of divorce on February 24,1999, reserving all other issues 
for trial. (R.424). 
B. An approximate five day trial was held in July 2000, resulting in a detailed 
Memorandum Decision (Attachment 1). Petitioner called numerous witnesses to value 
and claim Respondent's interest in three closely held companies which Respondent's 
parents had gifted him before and during the marriage. The trial court determined that 
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these gifts were not marital property and awarded all three to Dennis Chavez. The 
court then proceeded to divide marital property, award child support and alimony, and 
award Petitioner a substantial contribution towards her attorneys' fees and costs. 
Following the issuance of the court's detailed Memorandum Decision, counsel 
for Petitioner prepared a proposed set of Findings, Conclusions and Decree of Divorce 
which Respondent believed materially altered the trial court's detailed Memorandum 
Decision and which materially effected the allocation of the marital estate. Respondent 
immediately filed Objections (R.687), which were denied by letter dated October 2, 
2000 (R.702), and a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial with supporting affidavit (R.754-792). 
That Motion was denied November 6, 2000 (R.806), and this appeal followed. 
C. When the judgments, fees, and debts are considered, Plaintiff was 
awarded approximately 80% to 100% of the marital estate. In addition, the court clearly 
expressed its view that Mrs. Chavez, although working and capable of working, should 
not have to work full time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on February 3, 1978. Plaintiff filed 
for divorce in January 1997, and received a bifurcated divorce in 1999. The trial on all 
other issues was held on July 12, 13, 14, and 19, 2000, before Judge Raymond Uno, 
acting for the Honorable Anne Stirba, now deceased. 
2. The parties have five children, one of whom was married at the time of the 
divorce, another living with Dennis Chavez, without financial contribution from Tamra, 
and three other children: Dennis, age 17; Max, age 8; and Leo, age 7, living with 
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Tamra Chavez at the parties' residence. The parties agreed to continue to share joint 
legal custody of all children and the court adopted those agreements in the Decree of 
Divorce. 
3. The marriage was characterized as a traditional marriage with Dennis as 
the breadwinner and Tamra staying at home and assuming the traditional roles of 
housewife and mother. 
Dennis'Employment and Earning History 
4. Dennis began working for his father, Tony Chavez in the drywall and 
acoustics construction industry starting at age 11. Following Dennis' return from an 
LDS mission to Chile he became a junior estimator, a project manager, and ultimately a 
lead-estimator in Chavez, Inc., his father's construction business. 
5. In 1984 Dennis, his wife Tamra, and Dennis' sister started a separate 
construction company called Noise Control, Inc. From 1984 through 1988 this company 
accumulated $400,000.00 in losses on a highschool project in Wyoming. These losses 
were ultimately assumed by Dennis' father, Tony Chavez. Dennis then resumed 
working with his father in Chavez, Inc., a business which Tony Chavez founded and ran 
since the early 1960s. 
6. With the exception of one year, Dennis' income from wages fluctuated 
between $20,000.00 and $60,000.00 per year based upon the performance of the 
company and economic conditions. (Defendant's Exhibit 104.) In 1995, Dennis 
received a substantial distribution from Chavez, Inc. when the company reorganized for 
tax purposes from a C to a S corporation, increasing his ten year yearly average to 
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approximately $62,000.00 per year. From 1997 through the date of trial, Dennis' salary 
had been set at $36,000.00 per year. The trial court found Dennis' future income to be 
$8,712.00 per month, based upon his earnings and dividend income from non-marital 
investments gifted to him by his parents. 
Tamra Chavez' Employment History. 
7. Tamra Chavez was a housewife throughout the marriage and remained 
so into the parties' separation until May 1999, at which time she enrolled at Skin Works, 
taking a curriculum to become an esthetician. Her training continued through October 
1999, and thereafter she set up a business in her home providing esthetician services 
and retail sales. For the five months she provided figures for her at-home business, 
she received approximately $17,000.00 for services and increased her inventories by 
approximately $9,000.00. At trial she produced an exhibit which purported to 
summarize her average monthly net income from home sales at $1,081.00 per month. 
This was net of all of her expenses including capital expenditures and expenditures to 
purchase and increase her inventories to $9,000.00. In addition to this in-house 
income, Petitioner became concurrently employed as a part-time esthetician by the 
Treehouse Athletic Club Salon and between the period of February 25, 2000, and May 
15, 2000, a period of three months, Petitioner worked part-time and earned a gross 
income of $8,403.00. (R. 428) She testified that because of the problems of caring for 
one of her children she terminated that employment at the end of May, but anticipated 
taking another similar outside position at the end of the summer when her children 
returned to school. (Page 4, Memorandum Decision; Finding No. 6, Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law.) The trial court concluded that Tamra's net income was 
limited to $1,081 per month from her home business without further explanation. 
Non-Marital Gifts. 
8. Beginning in 1976, Respondent's parents began an estate gifting program 
to Respondent and his siblings. Dennis received approximately 25.27% in the common 
stock of CIB Corporation (R.889-189), which subsequently reorganized into Chavez, 
Inc. and Del Rio Corporation. Del Rio continued to hold the real property and building, 
which had been a part of CIB's operation since 1973, and had been previously owned 
by Defendant's father since the early 1960s. (R.889-187). The court found that neither 
Tamra or Dennis added to the value of Del Rio or Chavez, Inc. through his or her work 
efforts and while Respondent was employed by Chavez, Inc. he received a reasonable 
salary for that employment. The court held that Dennis had little, if any, control over 
Chavez, Inc. or its financial operations and had virtually no control in Del Rio 
Corporation. (Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact). 
9. Respondent's parents also gifted to Dennis an interest in the stock of a 
closely held corporation known for this purpose as S Company,1 in which Respondent 
has absolutely no management or control. Dennis is simply an outside shareholder of 
6.25% of the stock. The court specifically found that "all distributions received from S 
Company, other than those contributed to the parties' home, remain the sole and 
1
 The parties stipulated to a protective order that included the non-
disclosure of the name or ownership of S Company. Throughout the record, reference 
is made to a construction supply company whose name should not be disclosed in 
these proceedings. 
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separate property of Respondent." ( Finding No. 10b.) The court further found that S 
Company had in the past distributed all of its reportable profits, causing the court to 
comment that it was disturbed to note that $2 million in excess dividends was paid out 
to all shareholders from January 1994 through December 1999, creating a substantial 
cash flow problem. This problem and the potential violation of bank covenants and 
lines of credit required S Company to modify its distribution policies and the trial court 
found that S Company will not distribute sufficient future distributions of cash to permit a 
positive cash flow over the potential taxes to be imposed upon the shareholders by 
reason of the company's sub-chapter S federal tax status. Stated as Petitioner's 
counsel characterized it, S Company turned from an income producing investment to a 
growth company that does not distribute income. (T. 316) 
Marital Debts and Obligations. 
10. The parties executed a promissory note (Ex.68) with Dennis' father, Tony 
Chavez, in the amount of $65,766.00 dated June 30, 1983 payable June 30, 1984. The 
money was used as a down payment to purchase the parties' second home located on 
Dimple Dell Street in Sandy, Utah. A partial payment of $12,000.00 was made on May 
10,1984. 
The court held as a matter of law that a statute of limitations applicable to this 
promissory note would have run on June 30, 1990, prohibiting collection of the note. 
Respondent contends that there was an oral modification of the promissory note by his 
father extending the payment provisions of the note for the benefit of the parties. The 
only testimony offered on this extension was the testimony of Dennis Chavez (R. 513) 
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and his father Tony Chavez (R.889-198), both of whom testified that there was such an 
extension and modification. Tamra Chavez testified that while she was unaware of the 
extension, she allowed her husband to manage all of the parties' finances including 
their debts and obligations. (T. 344.) 
Tony Chavez testified that the amount owing under the note, including interest 
accrued through June 30, 2000, was $125,461.00. (See Defendant's Exhibit 108.) 
11. Dennis Chavez testified that he had a legal, moral, and ethical obligation 
to satisfy the principal and all interest of the note for several reasons, including his 
father's support of him throughout his life, the gifts his father has made to him, the jobs 
his father made available to him, the corporate bailout of Noise Control, Inc., and his 
relationship with his family. (T. 516.) Tamra Chavez testified that she was relying upon 
her attorney's advice that the note was not collected within the statutory period. (T. 
344.) The court concluded that the effect of his rulings is that the obligation is non-
enforceable and the $58,200.00 in principal and all accrued interest effectively became 
a gift to the parties with the running of the statute of limitations. 
Marital Property. 
12. The parties marital property as found by the court, consisted of a home 
located at 1177 Bear Hollow Circle, Draper, Utah, which the parties acquired after the 
sale of the Dimple Dell property. The following items constituted the marital property of 
the parties. 
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Property 
Home 
Bank One: Account No. 3017-53-97 
Bank One: Account No. 0002-94-52 
Tamra's Inventory 
Dean Wittier IRA - Dennis 
Dean Wittier IRA - Tamra 
1995 Astro Van 
1990Mitsuibuchi 
1993 Honda motorcycle 
1990 Glass Stream Boat 
Furniture 
Engagement Ring 
$100,000 Note Receivable from Chavez Inc. 
Debt to Susan Gallagher 
Total Net Value of Marital Property 
Value 
$350,000 I 
(minus $83,314 
mortgage principle = 
$266,686) 
$15,961 
$14,018 
$6,000 
$163,500 
$21,612 
$14,080 
$4,600 
$500 
$5,800 
$6,295 
$7,750 
$100,000 
($6,572) 
$620,230 
13. The Court's Memorandum Decision includes a note receivable from 
Chavez, Inc. as a marital asset which the Court distributed equally between the parties. 
When Petitioner's counsel prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
proposed Decree of Divorce, he voluntarily added the last paragraph of Finding No. 12 
which reads as follows: 
F:\USERS\LJC\chavez\appeal\StateCase.wpd 10 
"The Court finds that Respondent has had the benefit of the $100,000.00 
loan to Chavez, Inc. and that he should be obligated to pay Petitioner 
$50,000.00 as her portion of this asset as reflected in the distribution of 
assets set forth above." 
No where is this statement found in the Trial Court's detailed Memorandum Decision. 
14. The trial court divided the above marital property by awarding Tamra: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
Home 
Inventory 
Dean Wittier IRA - Tamra 
1990Mitsuibuchi 
Furniture 
Judgement for Share of Chavez Inc. 
loan receivable 
Total 
$266,686 
$6,000 
$21,612 
$4,600 
$6,000 
$50.000 
$354.898 
15. The court also ordered Dennis to pay $38,713.64 (.75%) towards Tamra's 
attorneys1 fees and costs of court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After reviewing the errors of law related to what the District Court failed to include 
as legitimate marital debt and what the court improperly included as marital property, it 
becomes apparent that the trial court awarded 100% of the net martial estate to Mrs. 
Chavez in order to make up for the court's conclusion that all other significant property 
belonged to the Respondent as his separate, gifted, non-marital property. The trial 
court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings justifying this significant departure from 
the established presumptions of an equal division. 
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The trial court also failed to make required findings, supported by credible 
evidence as to Petitioner's ability to support herself in spite of her own testimony 
concerning her desire to work, her earning history, and her ability to earn substantially 
greater income than the court chose to recognize. The court simply closed its eyes to 
her abilities by finding she earned substantially less income than she admitted. In 
addition, the trial court awarded Tamra excess alimony over her found necessary needs 
and expenses, and then arbitrarily approved $1,100.00 more in expenses, unsupported 
by other evidence, upon Petitioner's submission of the proposed Findings of Fact. 
Finally, the court failed to make the required findings concerning the ability of 
Respondent to pay attorneys' fees and costs of court, especially in light of the court's 
adoption of significant modifications to the original distribution of property set forth in 
the Memorandum Decision. 
ARGUMENT I 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT CHAVEZ, INC. OWED 
$100,000.00 AS A MARITAL ASSET IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
After five days of trial the Court issued its Memorandum Decision, which listed 
the marital and non-marital assets of the parties including a $100,000.00 note 
receivable from Chavez, Inc., which the Court divided equally among the parties. 
Respondent recognizes his obligation to marshal all evidence which could be used to 
support this finding since reviewing courts will uphold a trail judge's finding if competent 
evidence exists in the record. Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The marshaled record reveals: 
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a. The first indication this loan existed came from Petitioner's Exhibit 29, 
which simply listed all assets and values Petitioner either knew of or suspected may 
have existed. Petitioner offered no testimony regarding this loan. (R. 296.) 
b. When asked about this loan, Mr. Chavez testified that in 1995, after 
receiving an extraordinary distribution from Chavez, Inc., he loaned $100,000.00 back 
to the company so the company could maintain its cash flow requirements. Dennis 
further testified the full amount of the loan was paid back to him in 1996 and 1997. 
c. The Company's tax return for 1997 (Ex. 12) confirms that by year end, no 
obligation was owing to Mr. Chavez or any other shareholder. 
d. Petitioner's counsel's questions to Mr. Chavez reveals no question that 
Mr. Chavez received payment for the loan in 1996 and 1997. This was the same time 
the parties paid substantial funds for building, landscaping, and furnishing their new 
home, and paid taxes on the substantial distributions received. Accordingly, all 
evidence points to the non-existence of this receivable, not to its existence. 
The trial court held, however, the $100,000.00 loan still existed, and awarded 
each party $50,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan to Chavez, Inc. 
When Petitioner's counsel prepared the findings and decree, he added a finding 
which was not consistent with the court's original holding: 
Paragraph 12. The court finds that Respondent has had the 
benefit of the $100,000.00 loan to Chavez, Inc. and the he 
should be obligated to pay Petitioner $50,000.00 as her 
portion of this asset as reflected in the distribution of assets 
set forth above. 
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By adding this paragraph, Petitioner's counsel not only added a significant 
finding not made by the court, but he also changed responsibility for the payment of the 
loan from the company, Chavez, Inc., to Dennis Chavez personally. This was a 
significant change that the trial court had not contemplated in its original decision, nor 
did the court or the parties have an opportunity to argue the effects this provision would 
have upon Mr. Chavez's ability to pay this or any other judgment rendered by the 
court's decision, or its effects upon a fair allocation of the marital estate. 
The Decree prepared by Petitioner's counsel and entered by the trial court 
awards Mr. Chavez the proceeds from a non-existent $100,000.00 loan and at the 
same time orders him to be responsible for a $50,000.00 judgment, with interest, to 
Petitioner. Counsel's voluntary act cost Petitioner in excess of $150,000.00 from the 
original decision. 
Mr. Chavez immediately and timely objected to this finding, which objection was 
denied, without comment to the specific objection, by the trial court's letter of October 2, 
2000. Petitioner further moved the court for a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial in order to 
present evidence related to Mrs. Chavez's new claim based upon a theory of 
dissipation of a marital asset. The trial court simply denied Petitioner's application and 
this appeal followed. 
B. THE COURT'S NEW FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The finding proposed by counsel, that Mr. Chavez had the benefit of this 
$100,000.00 and therefore owed Mrs. Chavez $50,000.00, is also unsupported by 
competent evidence in the record. This finding and resulting judgment clearly works a 
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substantial hardship upon Dennis and constitutes an abuse of discretion. The 
marshaled evidence all comes from a colloquy in cross examination on the last day of 
trial. (See full transcript portion in attachment 2.) 
Petitioner's counsel asked Dennis at page 629 of the transcript: 
Q. And now, Chavez, Inc. you loaned the money to Chavez, Inc. back in 
1995 did you not? 
A. I return, yes I did. 
Q. And the tax return shows that you had loaned the money to them. In fact 
you'd moved into the house by 1996. I guess my question to you is what 
did, what happened to the $100,000.00? 
A. You'd have to check the documents. 
Q. Well, what's your recall at this time what happened to the $100,000.00? 
A. I deposited it. 
Q. And what happened to it after you deposited it? 
A. I expended it. 
Q. So $100,000.00 is just all gone now? 
A. I don't know you'd 
Q. Did let me just ask you this did you buy furniture, furnishings to set up 
your housekeeping? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's what you testified yesterday. But how come then the furniture and 
furnishings that the appraiser looked at only came to $260.00? 
A. For me? 
Q. Uh huh (affirmative). 
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A. You asked a general question if I bought furnishings. You didn't give me 
a time table. If you're addressing my personal purchases? 
Q. Uh huh (affirmative). 
A. Yes I did buy some things but they were gifts from my father. . . 
The colloquy just recited assumes a number of facts not in evidence and 
demonstrates that the questioner had mixed a number of subjects and time frames. 
First, Dennis Chavez did answer that he purchased furniture and furnishings with some 
of the proceeds from the $100,000.00 loan received in 1996. As he explains later at 
page 631 of the transcript, this was furniture for the house, while he was still married, in 
1996.2 
Counsel's questions regarding $260.00 of appraised furniture relates to 
furnishings purchased or given to him by his father after the parties' separation. At 
page 631 Respondent's counsel objects and attempts to clarify the record by stating: 
Mr. Sandack: We're talking about two different subjects. I just want to 
make the record clear. You're not asking him about furniture 
purchased with the $100,000.00 are you? 
to which Mr. Dart replies: 
Mr. Dart: Actually I am. I'm trying to get a sense of that. 
and he said: 
Mr. Sandack: Well let's get some, some foundation then because the 
timing's a little wrong I think. 
2
 One item alone, a bed set, cost over $10,000.00. (T. 364.) 
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That is when Respondent clarifies the purchase of furnishings for the home from the 
$100,000.00. 
Counsel then moves into to a wholly separate subject. Mr. Chavez is shown Ex. 
67, which is a summary of Respondent's bank balances in one of the Respondent's 
savings accounts with an opening balance of $80,000.00 on March 4,1997. Nowhere 
does counsel ask where these funds came from. To assume it contains the same 
moneys received from the Chavez, Inc. loan payback is not correct. Counsel asks at 
page 632 of the transcript: 
Q. Where did all that money go? 
Respondent begins to answer: 
A. $80,000.00, I've still got $19,000.00. 
Q. So where did the $60,000.00 difference go? 
A. To your client. 
Respondent's answer that he still had $19,000.00, referring to the balance 
demonstrated on the last entry of Exhibit 67, which shows $19,857.00 as a remaining 
balance on August 13, 1998. This trial occurred in July of 2000, almost two years later, 
and Respondent still had $15,961.00 from that same Bank One account, clearly 
demonstrating that the balances under discussion are somewhere in the area of 
$60,000.00, not $100,000.00 as the amended findings suggests. 
Continuing at page 632 of the trial transcript counsel now asks: 
Q. "Well except you're earning a salary during this period of time you're 
getting dividends from . . . 
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and counsel for Respondent interrupts with his objections: 
Mr. Sandack: Your honor your honor I've got to object to this. He's 
now asking him to account for every dime that 
occurred over not just a two year period back at 
March 4, 1997 through August 31,1998, but up til 
now, which is a three and one-half year period. 
They've got all the documentation. They have got all 
of the deposits and they've got all of the checks. For 
him to simply respond to that as a question now and 
make it appear as though he's hiding something is 
inappropriate. 
What then follows is a colloquy between the court and counsel after which 
Petitioner's counsel simply offers Exhibit 67 without any further follow up. Counsel then 
proceeds to argue with Respondent about the use of S Company dividends for support, 
as opposed to other monies. 
On re-direct, transcript 639-40, Respondent testified that he provided in 
discovery every check and every deposit from every statement and every account he 
had any interest in, both before and after the parties' separation. Mr. Chavez testified 
again that he loaned $100,000.00 to Chavez, Inc. and that he was repaid the bulk of 
that money in 1996, one year before the parties' divorce, and the rest in 1997. At no 
time did counsel for Petitioner ask Respondent about his deposits in 1996 or his 
expenditures in 1996. 
A cursory view of Exhibit 67 demonstrates two withdrawal periods, one in 1997 
for $10,000.00, and a substantial withdrawal in June 1998. These same withdrawals 
were the subject of discovery in pretrial discovery and are reflected in the Respondent's 
deposition taken by counsel for Petitioner. Each withdrawal was discussed and each 
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check turned over to Petitioner. To claim now that counsel had no knowledge, or that 
these expenditures were a dissipation of assets without showing what the expenditures 
were for or whether or not Dennis was restrained from making these withdrawals, is a 
mischaracterization of this record and prejudical to Respondent. 
Petitioner's counsel confirmed he had all documentation available to him. 
Transcript 658 
Mr. Sandack: And you agree that you have had all the documents that you 
requested at your disposal, all of the checks, all the deposits 
and all the bank statements? 
Mr. Dart: I would represent that through motions to compel and 
repeated letters requesting that document being provided, 
that ultimately we have, either through subpoena or from 
documentation back [in audible] office obtained that. I 
would, I would represent that its been a difficult process to 
get all that information. 
Mr. Sandack: Well I didn't ask you that question but you do . . . have a 
reputation do you not counsel of getting what you want. 
Mr. Dart: I hope that I get what's fair and I hope what I want is fair but 
I do strive to obtain what I, what I'm directed to. 
Counsel's argumentative and objectionable question required Respondent to 
recall three and one-half of years of expenses, all deposits, and all major withdrawals 
from all accounts. This record alone shows major uses of his funds; 
a) for the payment of significant tax liabilities and quarterly estimates 
demonstrated on the tax returns. (Exs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.) (R. 515.); 
b) temporary support payments of approximately $4,200.00 per 
month; 
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c) pre and post separation obligations for furniture, landscaping, 
building of the home, etc.; 
d) attorneys' fees for Petitioner and Respondent's counsel; 
e) private tuition payments for his children paid only because of the 
initial settlement. (R. 352.) 
C. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT AFFORDING 
RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THESE FINDINGS. 
In Bover Company v. Liqnell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Ut 1977), the Supreme Court 
reiterated the duty of a trial judge in contested cases "to find facts upon all material 
issues submitted for decision." The Court of Appeals often repeats a trial court's first 
duty in divorce cases is to make sufficiently detailed findings, so the reviewing courts 
know how ultimate conclusions have been reached. The Supreme Court in Bover v. 
Liqnell recommended that trial judges not "mechanically adopt" findings prepared by the 
prevailing party. 
Respondent attempted to bring these claimed differences to the court's attention 
through objections and a Rule 59 motion. The trial court's denial "for the reasons 
expressed in Petitioner's response" is not sufficient to supply the underlying findings 
necessary to support the findings of the trial court and the amended awards. These 
findings specifically fail to answer the following questions: 
a. On what basis did the trial court concluded that $100,000.00 was owed 
when all of the testimony clearly demonstrates that nothing was owed by Chavez, Inc.? 
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b. Why did the trial court find $100,000.00 was available to Respondent 
when it was clear by this exhibit that $80,000.00 was in the subject account and 
$19,000.00 remained as of August 1998. That same account containing almost 
$16,000.00 was ultimately divided by the court as marital property. Accordingly there 
has been a double counting and Tamra will be paid twice for that $16,000.00 portion. 
c. How is it consistent with the court's finding that Dennis Chavez was 
awarded the corporate interests in Chavez, Inc., Del Rio, and S Company and all 
income derived therefrom? It is these funds from S Company that were ultimately 
deposited into this account and should be considered his separate property. (T 526-
527.) 
All of the parties' assets, bank accounts, savings accounts, and all of the 
Petitioner's checks and deposits were available to Respondent's counsel and to the trial 
court. All bank accounts were accounted for as of the day of trial and divided by the 
court between the parties. Counsel's attempt at trial to question the Petitioner on what 
may have happened to a bank account containing $80,000.00 sometime on or around 
the date of the parties' separation was abandoned as a failed attempt to understand 
where monies were deposited from various distributions, including dividend 
distributions, and accounts which were found to have been non-marital, and what was 
paid from those accounts. Irrespective of their marital or non-marital characterization, 
all monies have been accounted for and there is no question raised in the record that 
monies were hidden or dissipated. All transactions have been disclosed. To suggest 
otherwise is not consistent with the record. 
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A trial court is afforded considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property 
interests and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. However, when there 
exists a misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
prejudice, where the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or where 
severe inequity results, manifesting a clear abuse of discretion, appellate courts should 
correct the resulting abuse. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
quoting Noranio v. Noranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Thomas v. 
Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Weighted against this standard, the court clearly 
1. Misunderstood all of the testimony that the loan had been repaid by 
Chavez, Inc. and no money was owed by Chavez, Inc. to Dennis Chavez as of 1997. 
The marshaled evidence above simply does not rise to the level of proof that a loan or a 
note receivable existed as of 1997 or the date of trial, July 2000. The court further 
misunderstood that this account contained the repaid funds. There is no evidence in 
the record which could support that assumption, and what evidence exists is "so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly 
erroneous." Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
2. The court misapplied the law by determining the existence of a valid debt 
owed by Chavez, Inc. to Dennis. Chavez, Inc. is not a party in this action. Of 
significance is the Petitioner's failure to ask Tony Chavez, the president of Chavez, Inc., 
or Rick Florez, its accountant, both of whom were witnesses at the trial, about the 
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existence of this loan. Whether or not the debt is enforceable against a third-party must 
be evaluated by a court having competent jurisdiction over all parties to the obligation. 
Only then can all legitimate facts be assembled for presentation and determination. 
Finlavson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Qpenshaw v. Qpenshaw. 
12 P.2d 364 (Utah 1932). 
Since there appeared no question that the debt did not exist, the court's finding 
of a legitimate debt is totally unsupported by evidence adduced at trial and marshaled 
hereunder. Had counsel for Petitioner not taken it upon himself to re-phrase the court's 
ruling and readjust the court's orders, Respondent could have lived with the original 
finding and order since collection or non-collection would equally effect both parties. 
However, when Mrs. Chavez's counsel voluntarily re-phrased the finding into a 
"dissipation of asset" theory and then rendered judgment against Mr. Chavez for 
$50,000.00, that certainly caused substantial prejudice upon Respondent which the trial 
court should have recognized and should have given Respondent an opportunity to 
argue. The trial court's failure to consider this substantial award and its effect upon the 
allocation of the marital estate, Dennis' ability pay attorneys' fees, alimony, or child 
support is prejudicial and an abuse of discretion. Allred v. Allred. 835 P.2d 974 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
There are no underlying findings supported by evidence that 
a) the amount available to Dennis was $100,000.00 rather than 
$60,000.00; 
b) the amount was marital rather than the separate property of Dennis; 
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c) that amounts paid from the account were not legitimate debts or 
obligations, marital or otherwise; 
d) Dennis was or was not under an order of the court not to dispose of 
property (In fact no temporary order was entered until September 1998 
from disposing of marital property). 
Accordingly, the court's original finding and the amended finding are insufficient to 
support the court's judgment, all of which created substantial hardship upon Dennis. 
Lastly, an equal pre-trial bank balance distribution is improper when the amount 
is incorrectly presumed dissipated. Evidence of dissipation must first be shown, then 
the burden shifts to show otherwise. Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); Parker v. Parker 996 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
ARGUMENT II 
D. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE AS A MARITAL DEBT. 
Both parties signed a promissory note to Tony Chavez in the amount of 
$65,766.00, which afforded them an opportunity to purchase their second home on 
Dimple Dell Road. The court found that Tony Chavez's failure to collect that note within 
six years of its due date violated Utah's statue of limitations, making the note legally 
uncollectible and turning the note into a unintended gift to both Dennis and Tamra 
Chavez. The trial court had no jurisdiction over Tony Chavez and should not have 
considered whether a debt is legally enforceable against either one or both of the 
parties because the creditor is not a party to the action. Finlavson v. Finlavson. supra. 
Utah law recognizes oral modifications to a written agreement as valid and 
binding where the parties relied upon the modification and one party performed in part 
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on that modification. In George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher, 
907 P.2d 1172, (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court held in a similar situation that a statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until there has been a repudiation or breach of the 
demand for payment. In Fisher, a family member borrowed money in order to obtain a 
home, agreed to an oral extension of the annual payments, and after his father's death 
many years later an action was commenced to collect upon the note. The court held 
that the parties entered into a oral modification of the payment provisions of the note 
and in so doing continued the enforceability of that note until demand was made for 
payment. Since payment of the Chavez promissory note was not due until demanded 
by Respondent's parents, the statute of limitations did not run from the original date the 
note should have been paid. 
Respondent argued to the trial court that should it disagree with his argument 
regarding enforceability of the note, the trial court should award Dennis sufficient marital 
assets to pay his father, recognizing that Respondent has no choice but to repay this 
debt to his parents. Since Plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the terms of her written 
promises, in equity she should not benefit from a statute of limitations defense. There 
is no question but that Tamra signed the promissory note, she agree to its repayment 
provisions through her husband's agency, she benefitted from the loan and she 
recognized Respondent's moral dilemma and ethical obligation to repay that loan to his 
parents. (R. 343-346.) A district court cannot simply assume that because parents 
have made gifts of certain property to their siblings that they would automatically forgive 
legitimate debts and obligations or make unintended donees their beneficiaries. See 
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Finlavson v. Finlavson. 874 P.2d 843 9utah Ct. App. 1994) "[t]he trial court must 
provide detailed findings explaining precisely what evidence it relied on in determining 
whether the benefit was a gift or a loan and whether it was conferred upon the 
individual or the couple. Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585, 587-88 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
By failing to consider this note a marital obligation, or even an individual 
obligation of Respondent's, and by disregarding the repayment, the court failed to 
consider how the obligation would effect an allocation of marital property or 
Respondent's ability to pay alimony, support, attorneys' fees or other judgments. By 
failing to make these findings, the court abuses is discretion. Barnes v. Barnes. 857 
P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The treatment of this case by the trail court raises an important policy question at 
issue: How are parents who need to make legitimate estate planning transactions going 
to be assured that their decisions are not overturned by a trail court adjusting their 
children's divorces? Dennis' parents' desire to gift to their children, not the spouses of 
their children, is evident in the court findings that gifts were made to Dennis and his 
other siblings equally. The trail court cannot know whether the unintended forgiveness 
of a promissory note and/or its treatment as a gift to a non-intended party is consistent 
or inconsistent with the estate plan of a non-party parent. Except in this case, Tony 
Chavez testified he never made a gift to Tamra. R. 196-197.) The court can not know 
how that unintended result will affect the parent's treatment of other siblings or future 
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gifting to Dennis. If the gifts are valid, if obligations are valid, then courts should 
respect their original purpose. 
ARGUMENT III 
E. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DISPROPORTIONATE 
DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY. 
The court specifically found that Dennis' ownership interest in Chavez, Inc., Del 
Rio, Inc., and S Company were gifted, non-marital properties. However, in listing these 
non-marital properties, the court adopts, by implication, the Petitioner's valuation of 
those assets and then notes that if all marital and non-marital assets were considered, 
Dennis would have a net worth double that of Petitioner's distribution of marital 
property. Apparently the Court relies upon this argument in awarding Petitioner a 
disproportionate amount of marital property. 
In the initial Memorandum Decision, Tamra was awarded $90,000.00 more than 
Dennis. 
However, the final outcome, as crafted by Petitioner's counsel, awarded Mrs. 
Chavez her home and judgments worth $354,898.00, while Mr. Chavez received his 
retirement accounts (without consideration for their present value and the taxable status 
of these funds) and other assets, offset by a $50,000.00 judgment to Tamra and a 
$38,713.64 judgment to pay Tamra's attorneys' fees. Assuming the non-existent 
$100,000.00 note from Chavez, Inc. existed, the court gives Mrs. Chavez twice as 
much marital property as Dennis. Assuming the $100,000.00 note from Chavez, Inc. 
does not exist, the disparity becomes even more apparent and abusive: $111,286.00 
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net value to Dennis and $354,898.00 net to Tamra, more than triple Dennis' share. 
More shocking, if Dennis assumes payment for the legitimate debt on the promissory 
note to his father, his share of marital property gets reduced to a negative $14,175.00 
($111,286.00 - $125,461.00). In other words Mrs. Chavez is awarded all marital 
property. 
Why was the Court so generous to Mrs. Chavez in dividing marital property? 
The Court did not make sufficient findings to justify this unusual allocation from the 
presumptive equal division of marital property acquired by the parties during the 
marriage. 
Generally, in a divorce proceeding "each party is presumed to be entitled to all of 
his or her separate property and 50% of the marital property . . . this presumptive rule 
of thumb however does not supercede the trial court's broad equitable power to 
distribute marital property regardless of who holds title. A trial court may elect to 
distribute marital property unequally when the circumstances and needs of the parties 
dictate a departure from the general rule. (Example to enable one party to fulfill an 
alimony or child support obligation.) See Thomas v. Thomas and Burke v. Burke. 733 
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1986) holding that trial courts should be guided by the general 
purpose of property division which is to allocate the property in a manner which best 
serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives.) 
In determining whether a court's division of property is equitable, the relative abilities of 
the spouses to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable 
division of the fixed assets of the marriage. An unequal division of marital property, 
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however, is only justified when the trial court memorializes, in commendably detailed 
findings, the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution. Thomas. 987 P.2d 
at 611. See also Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421 425. Bradford v. Bradford. 993 
P.2d 887 (1999). 
The court cited a number of considerations in its Memorandum Decision to justify 
such an inequitable allocation of marital property. Defendant contends those reasons 
are unsupported in fact or law. Again, the marshaled evidence is: 
1. At paragraph 14 of the Memorandum Decision the Court recites that 
"where gifted property, which includes practically all of the income generating sources 
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, is awarded one spouse, the remaining 
property need not necessarily be divided equally." Yet the gifted property did not 
constitute all of the income generating sources. Except to the extent that Petitioner 
received salary as a result of his employment with Chavez, Inc. for which the Court 
previously found he was reasonably compensated, the only other source of future 
income was from the gifted property of S Company which previously produced 
substantial dividends but which the Court found Defendant was unlikely to receive any 
amounts over and above the amounts necessary to pay taxes and in fact he will pay 
more in taxes than he receives. With respect to Del Rio the court recognized that 
Respondent's father controlled that land holding company and thus controlled all 
distributions. Tamra was awarded the parties marital home and used five of the rooms 
to produce significant income and depreciation. 
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2. The Court then relies upon a need to fairly divide economic assets and an 
income stream of the parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves after the 
marriage as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
This of course is a standard initially devoted to a fixing of alimony, not to a division of 
marital property, and it should afford Mr. Chavez an equal living standard as well as 
Mrs. Chavez. The trial court resolved these issues when it fixed and awarded Tamra 
alimony. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Essentially, the court 
recognizes the non-marital gift, but then attempts to divide property as though Tamra is 
fully entitled to those gifts. 
3. Finally, the Court notes that Respondent's position of an equal division, 
allows for no consideration for Plaintiffs role as a housewife and mother, describing her 
as a "partner in the business of marriage," and adopting arguments set forth Dunn v. 
Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1990). 
Should the Petitioner's role as a housewife for twenty years entitle her to more 
that 50% of the presumptive equal division of marital property? Dunn v. Dunn stands 
for the proposition that spouses should be entitled to a 50% share of marital property 
because they are equal partners in the business of marriage. It does not hold that 
spouses should be entitled to more unless the court makes detailed findings as to the 
unique circumstances which would justify more. 
What factors should justify her receiving more than 50% and becoming more 
than just an equal partner in the marriage? This Petitioner is in a position no different 
than numerous other spouses who have devoted their lives to raising their family and 
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children only to find themselves in a marital dissolution. It is those circumstances which 
protect spousal awards and the presumed equal division of property. The questions 
presented for review are whether the Court's considerations and findings comply with 
the "commendably detailed findings" and exceptional circumstances supporting a non-
equal distribution as set forth in case law. 
Respondent contends that the court's justifications for unequal treatment are all 
answered by an equal division of property and an award of child support and alimony. 
The court did not reduce Dennis' alimony, offset by additional marital property The 
court did not find Tamra had larger monthly expenses, unmet by her monthly income. 
Its principal justification is that if these closely held non-marital interests were valued 
they would have a higher value than Tamra gets from her equal share of marital 
property. If that was the law in Utah, no parent would gift their children property for fear 
of compromising their rights to an equal share of marital property. 
The trial court's rationale are not findings, they are simply a discussion of 
conclusions. Nowhere does the court find Tamra needs a stream of income from 
sources other than her alimony, child support, and earnings. Nowhere does the court 
find that Tamra contributed more to the marriage entitling her to 60%, 75%, or 100% of 
the marital estate. In truth, the court's conclusions are support by no findings at all. 
The court's rationale are based upon a misreading of the law clearly set forth in Dunn v. 
Dunn which statement was properly sited by Respondent allowing Petitioner full 
consideration for her role as a housewife and mother and thus entitling her to a 50% 
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share of marital property. Burke v. Burke. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. 
Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
ARGUMENT IV 
F. THE TRIAL COURT MADE INCONSISTENT RULINGS CONCERNING 
THE INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY IN THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
The issue of why the court included Respondent's purchase of his present wife's 
wedding ring as marital property focuses attention on his belief that the trial court 
treated these issues inconsistently. For example, Dennis purchased this ring with the 
use of his separate savings accounts from his S Company dividends. (R. 526.) The 
court found these dividends were Dennis' separate property. Why then has Tamra 
benefitted by the inclusion of this $7,500.00 amount into marital property when no 
finding was made that the purchase came from marital funds? 
Yet, when Dennis asked the trial court to award him credit for a number of 
marital items clearly in Tamra's possession and control, the court remained silent. For 
example: 
a) $5,000.00 taken from the parties Bank One joint account in cash in 
March 1998 which amount remains unaccounted for (R. 354-356); 
b) $1,800.00 in Tamra's business account as of the date of trial which 
the court simply listed as "pass through;" 
c) The credits received from returning Dennis' 1996 Christmas 
present of approximately $3,200.00 charged on Dennis' credit card account R. 
353); 
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d) The reimbursement Tamra was to receive for her having cancelled 
a Mediterranean cruise with her boyfriend in the amount of approximately 
$1,600.00 (R. 440-441); and 
e) credits that Dennis paid Tamra pursuant to the initial temporary 
order in the amount of $5,000.00 which she applied against her attorney's fees. 
The court also disregarded Dennis' characterization of the marital assets being 
of unequal value, for example equity in the home offset dollar for dollar against Dennis' 
retirement accounts which are subject to tax upon withdrawal and penalty if withdrawn 
early. The court failed to divide like find property but provided no justification for his 
failure to recognize the differences in this property. 
ARGUMENT V 
G. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT TO PETITIONER. 
Utah Authorities on the sufficiency of the trial court's findings regarding alimony 
awards is well established. The court must make sufficient findings concerning the 
receiving spouses needs, her ability to meet those needs, and the paying spouses 
ability to contribute to the receiving spouses deficiencies, given his own needs and 
circumstances. Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Respondent raises three concerns with respect to the court's award of alimony 
and child support to Petitioner: 
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Expenses 
First, the trial court's detailed Memorandum Decision specifically found 
Petitioner's needs to be $2,719.00 per month. In awarding $1,297.00 per month as 
child support and $1,200.00 per month alimony and in finding she could earn $1,081.00 
per month, the court awarded Petitioner $859.00 more than her reasonable monthly 
needs. Recognizing this failure Petitioner's counsel unilaterally included approximately 
$1,100.00 in additional expenses to justify the alimony award. Specifically the 
Memorandum Decision did not find Petitioner to be in need of attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $500.00 per month or a speculative reserve for income taxes of $250.00 per 
month, or an award of clothing allowance of $300.00 per month. Yet Petitioner's 
counsel granted her these claimed expenses simply by placing them in the proposed 
findings of fact. 
The marshaled evidence does not find much: 
1. Nowhere in the record did Tamra testify to these expenses with exception, 
by implication, of supplying certain checks she claimed were expended by the family in 
1996. The entire extent of Petitioner's testimony related to her expenses appears at 
transcript 67-70 and Exhibit 24, which does not include attorney's fees or a reserve for 
taxes. The court's own detailed findings include a statement that the reasonable 
expenses adopted by the court are from this Exhibit 24 and its evaluation of the 
Petitioner's testimony. The court found a substantial reduction in required monthly 
expenses and accordingly Petitioner's counsel should not have been allowed to 
readjust those expenses at his whim. With respect to clothes and auto insurance, there 
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is evidence in the record that could have justified the court's finding, but such is 
inconsistent with the court's detailed decision saying it reviewed all such expenses and 
the Petitioner's testimony and failed to find clothing or auto insurance as a reasonable 
expense. Clearly, taxes and attorney's fees were not testified to by Petitioner. The 
only other testimony, related to attorney's fees included the full cost of her attorney's 
fees and expert witness fees for which the court awarded her three quarters or 
$38,713.64, leaving her with a balance of $12,140.00. At the rate of $500.00 per month 
that obligation would be paid off in two years. 
Surprisingly, however, Petitioner found a way to get not just the remaining 
balance of the attorney's fees paid by an excessive alimony award, she also got 
$500.00 per moth more for the next 13 years. 
There is no testimony or other evidence adduced concerning a tax reserve. In 
fact, with the mortgage, tax free child support, deductions and exemptions, it is more 
likely than not that Tamra will pay no tax. Exhibit 8, Tamra's individual income tax 
return for 1999, shows exactly that. She paid no tax and had significant deductions for 
the business use of her home. If, in fact, Tamra pays $250.00 towards estimated taxes, 
this should be evidence that she can earn substantially more than the court found. A 
tax projection is speculative and adds to Respondent's arguments that no evidence 
supports this increase in monthly expenses. Even more surprising, however, is the 
court's specific finding that Dennis' dividend distribution from S Company will not be 
sufficient to cover the taxes and yet the court fails to include those taxes as an 
additional monthly expense for him or at least to deduct it from his gross income for 
F \USERS\LJC\chavez\appeai\StateCase wpd 35 
purposes of the alimony and child support calculation. The court appears again to 
show a bias by finding a negative dividend distribution but failing to consider that on 
Dennis' behalf, while at the same time giving Petitioner full credit for items the court 
heard no evidence on whatsoever. Abuse of discretion? Mistake? Inadvertent? In 
equitable? Respondent believes all of the above. 
Petitioner Earnings. 
The second area of contention deals with the court's findings related to 
Petitioner's earning abilities. Petitioner initially testified, using Exhibit 23, that her 
average income per month based upon the five months commencing January 2000 was 
$1,081.30 per month. The court accepted that testimony in full. What the court did not 
do, nor did the court explain why, was to recognize that these are net figures, after 
having deducted substantial amounts for capital contributions and inventory 
accumulation. Petitioner clearly demonstrated in the first five months of her in home 
part-time services that she was capable of producing substantially more than $1,081.00 
per month. Her gross income for the same time frame was $17,000.00 and increased 
inventory of $9,000.00. 
More striking, however, was the testimony that this did not include her additional 
income as a part-time esthetician at the Tree House Salon. (Record 65). It was 
demonstrated that for three of the same overlapping months, March 2000, April 2000, 
and May 2000, Petitioner made an additional $6,365.00, almost $2,100.00 per month, 
more while she carried on her part-time in-home business. (See Defendant's Ex. 114). 
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Tamra also testified that she expected to resume her outside esthetician job at another 
salon beginning in September of 2000 while continuing her in-home business. 
Respondent believes the court's findings related to Petitioner's ability to earn 
income are insufficient in that the court makes no determination as to why the Petitioner 
cannot continue to work both jobs as she had done prior to trial and how much she is 
likely to make given her intent to resume work two months following the date of trial. 
The trial court simply states the amount of income she will make is not yet known. 
While it is clear that there is sufficient evidence that Petitioner can in fact earn at least 
$1,081.00 per month, it is also clear in the record that she is capable of and in fact did 
earn substantially more. 
At page 384 of the transcript, Petitioner admits that the $1,081.00 per month "her 
attorney calculated" are in fact a starting wage that does not include her outside work 
where she averaged $3,000.00 per month and does not consider the potential sales of 
$13,000.00-$14,000.00 in product inventory at her home, and the use of five rooms in 
her home, all of which she planned to deduct for tax purposes. 
Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) provides: 
Gross income from self employment or operation of a 
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self employment or business 
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self employment or operation of a business shall be 
reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income 
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only 
those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate 
at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
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It is clear that the court accepted Petitioner's testimony of her entry level net 
earnings at $1,081.00 per month without including the substantial purchases Petitioner 
made for items used in the business including inventories, massage chairs and tables 
and other substantial purchases. These were not purchases in the ordinary course of 
her in home business. The court should have made a finding and determination as to 
what her projected business income would be, not relied upon her initial staring net 
income calculation. In addition, pursuant to Section 78-45-7.5(7)(d) of the Utah Code 
Annotated the court should have imputed income to the Petitioner from her additional 
part-time work as an independent contractor at the Salon she intended to work at or 
based income on the salon she had recently left. Petitioner does not qualify under the 
conditions indicated in for exemption from imputation of income. 
Respondent's Earnings. 
Finally, Dennis disagrees with the findings that he is capable of earning 
$8,732.00 per month in light of the court's findings that he will no longer enjoy positive 
cash flow from the dividends of S Company.3 The $8,782.00 figure came from 
Petitioner's Exhibit 21 calculating Dennis' gross income based upon a four year 
average including 1996, the highest year ever experienced by Dennis. The projected 
income is then reduced by one-half of S Company dividends in order to demonstrate 
what would happen if Petitioner was awarded one-half of S Company as a marital 
property. However, the court appears to have mistakenly adopted the $8,782.00 
3
 Dennis does not make this argument for purpose of child support 
calculations. 
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amount from this document believing it represents his average monthly gross wages 
reduced by 50% of S Company dividends. That is the only place this figure appears. 
The figure, however, is Petitioner's calculation of the average monthly gross dividends 
received from S Company. 
Aside from the court being wrong about Mr. Childs' testimony and its effects 
upon the income flow, the court failed to recognized that this gross income figure does 
not reflect taxes imposed on these amounts. 
Petitioner's counsel simply took adjusted gross reported income, he did not 
deduct taxes and he did not deduct the difference between reported income and 
distributed income. While this may be an appropriate calculation for child support, it is 
not for alimony, especially where the court has already made a specific finding that S 
Company will not distribute enough cash to cover the reported taxable income. 
Accordingly Dennis has no cash flow and no money available to pay the substantial 
support awarded beyond his salary and actual distributions in excess of taxes. 
Mr. Childs testified that S Company will not distribute more than $400,000.00 per 
year to all shareholders in the immediate future. Dennis' share, 6.25% equals 
$25,000.00. This amount will not be sufficient to pay taxes on the projected reported 
Subchapter S income of approximately $100,000.00 (6.25% of $1.6 million). Dennis 
does not receive that $100,000.00 but he must pay taxes upon that amount. (R. 308, 
503-504.) Accordingly, this $8,732.00 calculation is not supported by the evidence, it is 
inconsistent with the court's own determinations and it clearly does not allow the parties 
to continue the same alleged standard of living used by Petitioner in her arguments. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
H. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEE AND 
COSTS OF COURT. 
The Court of Appeals in Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and 
Schaumberg v. Schaumbera. 875 P.2d 598(Utah Ct. App. 1994) described the process 
and findings which a court must make before awarding attorney's fees in domestic 
case: the courts have discretion to award fees so long as the award is based upon 
findings regarding the need of the receiving spouse, the ability of payor spouse to pay 
and the reasonableness of the fees. 
The trial court gave no consideration to the Respondent having paid $5,000.00 
towards Petitioner's attorneys' fees after the parties' Settlement Agreement was set 
aside, or to Respondent's claim that Petitioner paid her initial attorneys from marital 
property she had withdrawn from the parties' accounts without Respondent's 
knowledge or consent. More importantly, however, the court could not have considered 
Respondent's ability to pay either out of property distributions or income for a number of 
reasons: 
1. The award of attorneys' fees was made before the court changed its mind 
by accepting Petitioner's changes awarding an additional $50,000.00 judgment; 
2. The court failed to recognize, as earlier indicated, that Respondent would 
no longer receive the substantial dividends he earlier enjoyed from S Company; 
3. That Respondent had no assets, including all of the non-marital assets he 
was awarded, which could be used to produce or borrow monies for the payment of 
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these substantial legal fees. There is simply no indication that the trial court exercised 
the process of considering Respondent's ability to pay or Petitioner's ability to pay. 
A marshaling of the evidence does reveal an award of all cash accounts to 
Respondent in the total amount of $29,979.00 and assets which could be sold: a 1995 
Astro Van $14,080.00, a motorcycle $500.00 and a boat $5,800.00; total proceeds if all 
assets were liquidated equally $50,359.00. that amount would be sufficient to pay the 
attorney's fees if the court had not also rendered a $50,000.00 judgment against 
Dennis for Tamra's share of the supposed Chavez, Inc. loan. 
Other than these assets, Dennis was awarded his interest in Chavez, Inc., Del 
Rio, and S Company none of which produce the kind of income necessary to respond 
to these fees. 
While there is evidence that could be used in this record to support the award, 
there is nothing in the decision which reflects the court's findings regarding Dennis' 
ability to pay, Tamra's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of those fees. 
Respondent questioned the extent of Petitioner's attorneys' fees and court costs 
by the number of non-lawyer personnel counsel had available to him and charged for in 
the courtroom, and by the inclusion of a substantial expert witness fees, whose 
valuation was limited solely to non-marital property. On this major issue Respondent 
clearly prevailed. In fact the major part of Petitioner's case presented to the trial court 
was based upon Petitioner's contentions that she ought to share in the value of non-
marital gifted properties in addition to a reasonable share of marital equities. The court 
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held all costs and all fees reasonable, but on what basis? These findings do not 
answer the questions raised and leaves one guessing as to why. 
Respondent has been left with no assets with which to respond to this 
$38,000.00 judgment for attorneys' fees with the exception of the cash awarded to him. 
If the $50,000.00 judgment is upheld, Petitioner will have virtually no assets for the 
payment of these judgments and attorneys' fees and costs of court. The Petitioner 
would then be limited to net available income which the court has already held is 
significantly impaired by S Corporation's change in dividend policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons expressed herein Respondent prays that the court 
remand, with directions to the trial court: 
a. vacating the award of $50,000.00 for Petitioner's share of the Chavez, 
Inc. receivable or Petitioner's share of monies made available to Respondent; 
b. vacating the court's holding that the promissory note to Respondent's 
parents was unenforceable and reconsider the effect payment of this note will have 
upon an allocation of the marital estate and Respondent's abilities to pay alimony 
support or other judgments. 
c. vacating and remanding the determination of alimony by recognizing 
Petitioner's admitted increased abilities to earn income and support for herself, and her 
reduced expenses as originally determined by the trial court. 
d. reversing and remanding the award of attorneys' fees and costs of court 
for further consideration consistent with the parties' abilities to pay; and 
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e. finally, reversing and remanding the award and division of marital property 
to equally divide like kind property and to make such adjustments as may be necessary 
to equally divide marital property. 
Respectfully submitted this / > day of August, 2001. 
By: 
s<jb. Sandack.^s togefyu. banaacK.tsq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
Dennis Chavez 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO- 974900264 
vs. : 
DENNIS M- CHAVEZ, 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Wednesday, the 12th, 13th, 14th and 
19th days of July, 2000, plaintiff appearing in person and by her 
attorney, B.L. Dart and defendant appearing in person and by his 
attorney Roger D. Sandack, and the Court having received evidence 
from the testimony of witnesses, stipulations and exhibits and the 
matter having been argued and submitted and the Court taking the 
matter under advisement, the Court now being fully advised and 
incorporating all admitted exhibits, hereby makes the following 
findings. 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the 3rd of February, 1978. 
2. Both parties are residents of Salt Lake. County, State of 
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Utah, and have been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the filing of this action for 
divorce. 
3. This case has been bifurcated and a Decree of Divorce has 
heretofore been entered in this action under terms that 
all financial issues are to be determined as of the 
present as if no Decree of Divorce has been entered. 
4. The parties met each other when plaintiff was 15 years of 
age and defendant was 19 years of age. At that time 
respondent was working for his father. Thereafter, 
defendant went on an LDS mission at age 21 while 
plaintiff was still in high school. When defendant came 
back from his mission, plaintiff was working at a dory 
cleaners and just out of high school. The parties were 
subsequently married on February 3, 1978, when plaintiff 
was 19 and defendant 23 years of age. 
5. There have been five children born as issue of said 
marriage, three of whom remain minors: Natalie Elizabeth 
Chavez, now age 21, born May 30, 1979; Erica Alison 
Chavez, now age 18, born February 21, 1982; Dennis Manuel 
Chavez, II, born December 5, 1983; Max Daniel Chavez, 
born April 20, 1993; and Leo Chavez, born August 5, 1994. 
The oldest child, Natalie, is a m?rried, emancipated 
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adult. The second child began residing with defendant in 
approximately November, 1999, and will finish her high 
school education in August, 2000. Defendant has been 
providing Erica's support without contribution from 
plaintiff since November, 1999. No evidence has been 
presented showing that either party is not a fit and 
proper parent or that custody is an issue. Both parties 
are capable of being awarded the care, custody and 
control of their children. With respect to the remaining 
three children, the parties should be awarded joint legal 
care, custody and control of the minor children with 
plaintiff being designated as the physical custodian. 
The parties previously agreed by stipulation that the 
children shall each have the right to choose and elect 
which parent they wish to reside with after they have 
reached the age of 15 years. Each party shall have 
equal, reasonable rights to visitation with the children 
to visit at all reasonable times and places. In the 
event the parties are unable to agree on reasonable 
visitation, the standard visitation schedule contained in 
Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-33 and -37 are to apply and 
be followed by the parties. 
6. During this marriage plaintiff was effectively a 
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housewife through most of the marriage (except for a nine 
month period when she was employed at Nordstroms) , 
raising the children of the parties and this was her 
status at the time of the separation of the parties and 
the filing of this action for divorce in February, 1997. 
At the time of the filing of this action, plaintiff was 
without employment and without substantial post-high 
school education. She remained at home caring for the 
children until May, 1999, when she enrolled at Skin 
Works, in a curriculum to become an esthetician. She 
attended the training until October, 1999, when she set 
up business in her home, providing esthetician services 
and retail sales. She received approximately $17,000 for 
services rendered at her home and has increased her 
inventories for her retail sales by approximately $9,000. 
She has provided evidence of her income from her home 
business for the first six months which reflects an 
average net monthly income of $1,081. (Pltf. Ex. 23) In 
February, 2000, plaintiff became employed as an 
esthetician by the Tree House Athletic Club Salon in 
Sandy, Utah. Between approximately February 25, 2000 and 
May 15, 2000, plaintiff worked part-time earning gross 
income of $8,403 from her services and commissions from 
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the Tree House Athletic Club Salon. Because of problems 
of caring for the children, her employment at the Tree 
House was terminated at the end of May. She anticipates 
taking another day spa position at the end of the summer 
when the children have returned to school, but the amount 
of income she will derive from that position is not yet 
known. 
Plaintiff' s reasonable monthly expenses for her needs and 
necessities include the following (Pltf. Ex. 24 and 
testimony, and as adjusted by the Court): 
ITEM EXPENSE 
$ Automobile 
Charitable donations 
Child care 
144 
8 
150 
ITEM 
Dry cleaning 
Entertainment 
Cable TV 
Gifts 
Groceries 
Grooming 
Health club 
House payment 
Household miscellaneous 
Alarm 
Cleaning 
Repair 
Supplies 
Yard 
Magazines 
Medical, dental, Rx 
EXPENSE 
52 
29 
100 
400 
75 
95 
775 
23 
100 
137 
16 
100 
6 
100 
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Recreation 
Taxes - Salt Lake County Assessor 
Vacation/travel 
Utilities 
Electricity 
Gas 
-Sewage 
Telephone 
Water 
38 
62 
78 
102 
43 
12 
36 
32 
TOTAL $2,719 
Defendant, during this marriage has worked, primarily 
with and for his father in Chavez, Inc., a drywall and 
acoustical contractor, as a chief estimator, where he has 
earned a steady income. He has worked from the age of 
11. He has attended the University of Utah and has 
served on an LDS mission. From 1973 to 1985 he was a 
junior estimator, project manager and lead estimator for 
Systems, Inc. From 1984 to 1988, he was president of 
Noise Control. In working on Emerson High School in 
Wyoming, he encountered difficulty and had losses of 
$400,000. Tony Chavez took over and completed the 
project. Defendant then and is currently employed at 
Chavez, Inc. at a base salary of $36,000 (which was 
previously $60,000) a year from Chavez, Inc. In 
addition, he receives bonuses, dividends and other 
benefits including health insurance, the use of an 
automobile, including payment of all expense in 
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connection therewith, including insurance, gasoline and 
maintenance, free membership at the Hidden Valley Country 
Club with payment of any expenses incurred there, and 
travel, including trips to Hong Kong, Korea, Europe and 
several trips to Mexico, primarily paid for by Chavez, 
Inc., or as a result of his employment by Chavez, Inc. 
Defendant's reasonable monthly expenses for his needs and 
necessities include the following (Def. Ex. 24 and 
testimony): 
ITEM 
Housing and utilities 
Taxes on home 
Food 
Clothes 
Entertainment 
Donations 
Medical/health 
Insurance 
Dry cleaning 
Incidentals 
Visitation needs 
Home repair and maintenance 
Subscriptions 
Gifts 
Attorney's fees 
Reserve for income taxes 
EXPENSES 
$ 
1 
1 
750 
200 
300 
100 
100 
50 
75 
100 
60 
75 
80 
75 
15 
75 
,000 
,000 
TOTAL $4,055 
It should be noted that attorney fees of $1,000 is 
already included in his calculation. Otherwise, his living 
expenses would be reduced to $3,055. Plaintiff's living expenses 
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do not include any attorney fees. 
10. There has been an issue in this case regarding the 
question of whether the assets owned by the parties are 
marital or gifted and with regard to that issue and the 
father/son relationship, the Court finds as follows: 
a. That beginning in 1976, defendant's parents began 
gifting to defendant (and their other children) 
approximately 25.27 percent interest in the common 
stock of CIB Corporation which subsequently 
reorganized into Chavez, Inc., and Del Rio 
Corporation. Del Rio was created to hold the real 
property and building which had been part of CIB' s 
operation since 1973. The Court further finds that 
defendant has no managerial interest, input or 
control in the Del Rio Corporation. According to 
the testimony of defendant, Tony Chavez distributes 
royalty payments from Del Rio at his discretion. 
The Court finds that to a certain extent, defendant 
was hired to provide some managerial control over 
the estimating and sale functions of the Drywall 
Division of Chavez, Inc. (for which he receives a 
reasonable salary), however, the Court notes that 
defendant has little, if any, control over the 
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company or its financial operations. Specifically, 
he cannot, and does not (a) appoint management; (b) 
determine management compensation (c) set policy; 
(d) acquire or liquidate assets without the 
specific consent of his father; (e) select 
businesses; or (f) make acquisitions. Defendant 
reports directly to his father, the company's 
founder, Tony A. Chavez. Defendant has two 
employees who report to him, an apprentice 
estimator and an assistant clerk. 
Chavez, Inc. employs approximately 35 people in two 
divisions: (a) the Uniwall Division which assembles, sells and 
installs a demountable wall partition developed personally by Tony 
Chavez; and (b) the Drywall Division which competitively bids upon 
commercial installation of drywall. Defendant is employed by this 
division. 
The defendant's mother and father control in excess of 50 
percent of the Chavez, Inc. stock. Defendant has no responsibility 
for financing, invoicing, billing, tax preparation or reporting, 
human resources, payment of wages or the supervision of 32 out of 
the company's current 35 employees. While defendant ultimately 
reports directly to his father, Tony Chavez, he works most closely 
with the project superintendent, Dan Warath, who reports on a daily 
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basis to the President, Tony Chavez. 
b. During the course of the parties' marriage, 
defendant's parents also gifted an interest in the 
stock of a closely-held corporation known as 
Swanson Building Materials, Inc. The Court finds 
that this stock was gifted to defendant by 
defendant's parents; and that defendant's parents 
treated defendant equally with his other siblings. 
The Court further finds that defendant has 
absolutely no management or investment control over 
the decisions and/or efforts in Swanson Building 
Materials, Inc., and, thus, all distributions 
received from Swanson Building Materials other than 
those contributed into the parties' home, remain 
the sole and separate property of defendant. The 
Court further finds that Swanson's will not 
distribute sufficient future distributions of cash 
to permit a positive cash flow over the potential 
taxes to be imposed upon the full distribution of 
dividends, by reason of its subchapter S federal tax 
status. The Court further finds that defendant's 
ability zo sell or liquidate this interest is 
governed oy a shareholder agreement which controls 
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who can be a stockholder and offers a first right 
of refusal based upon the book value of the 
company. 
In reference to this finding, the Court is disturbed 
to note that $2,000,000 in excess dividends was paid out from 
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1999 (Pltf. Ex. 22a), despite 
an independent audit being conducted annually, a controller 
overseeing the company finances, a Board of Directors having access 
to the Company's books and an account firm filing annual taxes. 
There appears to be some failure of duty on the part of someone. 
Finally, a waiver of covenants on the banks' line of credit for the 
last three years to meet certain ratios in order for their line of 
credit to be renewed annually in order for release of audited 
financial statements seems to sound an alarm to anyone connected 
with Chavez, Inc. 
c. Defendant has taken the position in this action 
that monies provided him by his father to assist 
the parties in the construction of their home on 
Dimple Dell were borrowed funds and that those 
funds evidenced by a promissory note is still an 
obligation which is enforceable. The Court finds 
that the monies when first provided were evidenced 
by a promissory note in the amount of $58,200, 
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dated June 30, 1983, and due and payable on the 30th 
day of June, 1984. (Pltf. Ex. 68). A part payment 
of $12,500 was made May 10, 1984. The facts do not 
support defendant's position that this obligation 
is still outstanding as it is clear that the 
statute of limitations applicable to this 
promissory note is a six-year statute of 
limitations which ran on June 30, 1990 over ten 
years ago. Also, the facts do not support 
defendant's contention there was an oral 
modification of the promissory note. The effect is 
that the obligation is not enforceable and the 
$58,200 effectively became a gift to the parties 
with the running of the statute of limitations. 
d. This is a marriage of 20 years which is more than 
half the length of plaintiff's life during which 
she remained home as a stay-at-home wife, raising 
the five children of the parties. 
e. The parties' life revolved around defendant's 
employment with Chavez, Inc. and his relationship 
with his father, Tony Chavez. All of the vacations 
of the parties were planned to coincide with family 
trips paid for b^ Tony Chavez, including the trips 
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to Mexico, Europe and the Orient, all of which were 
paid for by Chavez, Inc., or as a result of the 
work of Chavez, Inc. These trips usually were 
family affairs with brothers and sisters coming 
along, which were organized and substantially paid 
for by Tony Chavez and his wife, Nancy, or Chavez, 
Inc. 
Despite the Court's finding in a. and b. above 
relating to defendant's responsibilities with Chavez, Inc., there 
is also evidence of defendant's more active role in the Company. 
He has been with Chavez, Inc. during all his working days after 
returning from a mission; next to Tony Chavez, he is the only 
member of Tony Chavez's family who is actively involved in Chavez, 
Inc.; next to Tony and Nancy Chavez, he is the largest shareholder 
in Chavez, Inc. and Del Rio; in a letter dated 1/4/96 under the 
Chavez, Inc. letterhead relating to passing of a resolution by the 
Board of Directors, Tony Chavez is listed as Pres. and Dennis as 
V.P. (Pltf. Ex. 72); Bank One account #1327-4473 lists account 
holders as Tony Chavez and Dennis Chavez ($47,918 balance as of 
4/5/00, Pltf. Ex. 36); Bank One account #1328-4233 Del Rio account 
lists as account holders Dennis Chavez and Tony Chavez ($36,361.99 
and a withdrawal of $33,851.36 as of 4/28/00, PLtf. Ex. 37); a 
Keyman/Universal Life Insurance with General American Insurance in 
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the sum of $200,000 with Dennis Chavez as insured and owner and 
beneficiary listed as Chavez, Inc. (Pltf. Ex. 77 at pp. 7-8) ; and 
a letter from Dad and Mom to Dennis (date obliterated) stating, "I 
am very concerned about you and the challenges you are now facing 
with your divorce proceeding and all the other problems you have in 
running our business." (underline for emphasis, Pltf. Ex. 66) As 
the chief estimator for Chavez, Inc., he must have a thorough 
understanding of the actual costs of bidding for work to be 
performed, a very critical operation of the company. Tony Chavez 
has a serious cancer problem and the only logical successor to Tony 
is Dennis based on the above observations. Dennis is intelligent 
and articulate and capable of operating on a higher level than 
attributed to him in the trial testimony. His current salary does 
not reflect this. 
f. The parties went to their in-laws' home at least 
two weekends a month for barbecues and family 
gatherings and swimming. 
g. Defendant would confide more with his father than 
with plaintiff on all financial affairs. 
h. The first residence was a duplex owned by Tony 
Chavez and their next residence on Dimple Dell was 
one in which Tony Chavez was involved in making the 
decision to buy this home. 
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11. Plaintiff introduced evidence reflecting the income 
earned and received by the parties which effectively was 
without any income of plaintiff. The income reflected 
the following figures (Pltf. Ex. 21, Def. Ex. 104) 
1994 $192,305 
1995 334,594 
1996 235,594 
1997 186,926 
1998 159,555 
1999 193,669 
The average annual income for the past four years of 1996 
through 1999 is $194,030 a year, or $16,169 a month. 
There was testimony indicating that a portion of this income 
derived from Swanson, Inc., in the form of dividends will 
effectively be reduced by 50% in the future. The Swanson dividends 
for those four years total $421,559 or $8,782 a month. Based upon 
testimony given at trial, it appears that these dividends will be 
only half in the future of what they have been in the past. There 
was testimony that since Swanson is a subchapter S corporation, 
substantially all of the distributions will be used to offset 
federal and state income taxes imposed on defendant's share of all 
corporate profits. 
12. During the marriage the parties have acquired substantial 
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assets and those assets should be awarded as follows 
REAL PROPERTY DENNIS 
House and real property at 1177 Bear 
Hollow Circle, Draper, UT. Webber 
appraisal $350,000, less mortgage 
7/7/00 $83,314 = equity of $266,686 
BUSINESS/PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
Chavez, Inc. - 10,3126 shares or 
25.27% (gift) $97,961 
Del Rio Corporation - 2431,276.68 
shares or 25.27% (gift) $197,742 
Swanson Building Materials, Inc. 
1250 shares or 6% (gift) 236.152 
Intermountain Advisory Services, 
Inc. - 625 shares (involuntarily 
dissolved) 
RGL Investments (in son's name) 
INVESTMENT AND BANK ACCOUNTS 
Dean Witter #052779 (stmt 5/31/00) 
(after separation - $1,755) 
Bank One #3017-5397 (stmt 5/31/00) $15,961 
Bank One #0002-9452 (stmt 6/19/00) 14,018 
Bank One #1327-4473 Tony/Dennis Chavez 
(stmt 4/5/00) ($47,519) (Non-marital) 
Draper Bank, checking, Tamee (personal) 
Draper Bank, checking, Tamee (business) 
Tamee's inventory 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
TAMEE 
$266,686 
pass-thru 
Pass-thru 
6,000 
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Dean Witter IRA #037707 (stmt 5/31/00) $163,500 
Dean Witter IRA #037708 (stmt 3/31/00) $ 21,612 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1995 Astro Van $ 14,p80 
1990 Mitsubishi Montero 4D $ 4,600 
1983 Honda 250 cc motorcycle 500 
1990 17.5 Glass Stream boat 5,800 
Furniture and furnishings 295 6,000 
LIFE INSURANCE 
Great Western Life $500,000 
(Def. To continue payment) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Inter vivos trust 
Engagement ring, Lori Christian $ 7,750 
Hidden Valley Country Club 
(belongs to Chavez, Inc.) 
$100,000 loan to Chavez, Inc. 50,000 $ 50,000 
Susan Gallagher debt (Pltf. Ex. 47) (6,572) 
Marital debt (promissory note 
to Tony Chavez, gift) 
(considered a non-existing asset) 
TOTAL $265,332 $354,898 
NET DISTRIBUTION $265,332 $354,898 
It should be noted that if all the amounts not included 
in defendant's assets were included, defendant's total distribution 
would be $846,461. That amount is his minimum net worth at this 
time. That is almost double of plaintiff's distribution. 
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13. Based upon the foregoing assumptions of income and 
property division, the Court finds that defendant should 
pay, pursuant to joint custody child support worksheet 
(See, Rehm v. Rehm, 3 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 8) , and 
plaintiff's income of $1,081 per month and defendant's 
income historically of $8,782 (which, in the opinion of 
the Court, is a better reflection of defendant's average 
income and his income stream in the future, rather than 
his current reduced income of $36,000 annually, and 
taking into consideration a purported 50% reduction in 
Swanson, Inc. dividends), to plaintiff as child support 
for the three minor children of the parties commencing 
with the month of August, 2000, the sum of $1,297.00 a 
month. 
So long as defendant has an obligation to pay child 
support he should continue to provide medical and health insurance 
as provided through his employment and each of the parties should 
be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical, dental, 
orthodontia and counseling expenses. 
14. Where gifted property, which includes practically all of 
the income-generating sources enjoyed by the parties 
during their marriage is awarded one spouse, the 
remaining property need not necessarily be divided 
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equally. Such as in this case, there is need to provide 
for the plaintiff adequate income to enable her to begin 
her post-marital life with some degree of economic self-
sufficiency. In the Matter of the Marriage of Pierson, 
653 P.2d at 1262 (1982); also, there is need to fairly 
"divide the economic assets and income stream of the 
parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves after 
the marriage as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage." Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 6 (Zimmerman concurring). 
Although defendant claims their living standards during 
their marriage was modest, that is contradicted by his 
father's letter to him dated 4/3/99 wherein he states, 
"We were patient with you and Tammee as we knew you were 
trying to get a good start. I believe you had enough 
funds to pay this note but instead you and Tammee started 
to live like very rich people, and spending like there 
was no tommorow (sic)." (See Pltf. Ex. 64) Plaintiff's 
testimony also supports her contention that the family 
enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. 
In addition, defendant's position allows for no 
<consideration, in the marriage or for the production of income, of 
the role of a housewife and mother. It should be noted that the 20 
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years of her marriage to defendant were primarily the most 
productive years of her life. Although, plaintiff was neither a 
stockholder or employee of Chavez, Inc., she was a partner in the 
"business" of marriage and should share in its benefits, as stated 
in the Dunn case, "While she was not a partner in the business of 
orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the "business1 of 
marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth 
of his practice and the business. As such, she is entitled to her 
fair share in any marital assets derived from their joint efforts 
in the endeavor." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
Likewise, defendant was able to develop his skills, increase his 
knowledge and expand his business contacts and become an integral 
part of Chavez, Inc. from which he will increasingly benefit from 
for many, many years to come and provide for him a very comfortable 
lifestyle. Although relating to the division of property, the same 
can be said of alimony awards, when the Appellate Court stated, 
"The lower court's approach to marital property distribution is 
troublesome as it suggests a weighing only of each partner's 
financial contribution to the marriage. Such analysis ignores the 
contributions of love, encouragement, and companionship, which 
elude moretary valuation. Such an analysis also gives short shrift 
to spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child care." Dunn 
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v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1324 at 5 (Utah App. 1990). 
Unfortunately, the gradual, dramatic and precipitous drop 
in salary and dividends, relegation of his job position to a minor 
role in the company, the demand for the payment of the promissory 
note, the imputing of income to plaintiff who is barely trying to 
establish herself and still care for three minor children and 
failing to attribute any contribution made by plaintiff to the 
marriage, simultaneously occurring at the time of the divorce 
proceedings suggests more than mere coincidence, a scenario of 
possible orchestration intimated by plaintiff. Putting it another 
way, if defendant were plaintiff and plaintiff were defendant, 
would this scenario cause any concern? It does cause this Court 
concern and should be factored into any award given, particularly 
child support, alimony and attorney fees. This is not a criticism 
of any party because proponents and opponents must necessarily 
protect their best interests at the time of trial and no one can be 
faulted. This is the dilemma the Court must consider judiciously, 
fairly and equitably. 
The Court has considered the needs of the plaintiff; the 
earning capacity of the plaintiff; the ability of the defendant to 
provide support; and, the length of the marriage as required by 
case and statutory law in Utah and finds "alimony is appropriate." 
Rehm v. Rehm, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. Based on the foregoing, other 
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considerations suggested by this Court and the current financial 
circumstances of the parties, plaintiff should be awarded alimony 
from defendant in the amount of $1,200 per month for a period of 15 
years, considering the length of the marriage and the lifestyle 
enjoyed by the parties during that time, or until such time as 
plaintiff remarries, cohabits or the death of either party. It 
should be noted that defendant has already remarried despite his 
alleged reduction of income. 
15. So long as there is an obligation for child support or 
alimony,- defendant should continue to maintain in force 
his currently held policy of life insurance in the face 
amount of $500,000, with plaintiff and the minor children 
as beneficiaries thereon. 
16. It has been necessary for plaintiff to retain an attorney 
to represent her in this action. The Court finds, based 
on the evidence introduced during trial, that plaintiff 
is without sufficient funds with which to pay all of her 
attorney's fees in this action, that defendant does have 
the funds and resources to pay the attorney fees, and 
that the attorney fees are reasonable considering the 
extensive time and effort expended by plaintiff's counsel 
in discovery anc" four days of trial time. Rehm v. Rehm, 
363 Adv. Rep. 8 
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Plaintiff was initially represented by John Anderson of 
Anderson and Karrenberg to represent her, incurring attorney's fees 
in the amount of $3,523.80, which amount has been paid by 
plaintiff. 
Since the withdrawal of John Anderson, plaintiff has been 
represented by the firm of Dart, Adamson & Donovan, and the Court 
finds that the time spent and the expenses incurred by them were 
necessarily incurred and are reasonable in amount. This amount is 
$47,230.18. 
The only amount paid against these fees are $5,000, 
leaving a remaining balance of $42,230.18. In addition, plaintiff 
has incurred expert witness fees in the amount of $8,624.38. The 
Court finds that based upon the differential of income between the 
parties and the differences in their financial resources, as well 
as the testimony of the parties regarding their marital history and 
divorce proceedings, it is reasonable that plaintiff should be 
awarded her unpaid attorney's fees and costs incurred in this 
action in the amount of $38,713.64, or three-fourths of the amount 
prayed for by plaintiff. 
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17. Plaintiff should be restored her maiden name. 
18. Consistent with the above findings, plaintiff's attorney-
shall prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment 
in this case. , 
Dated this*/ —day of August, 20<3O^ " 
RAY: 
SENi'dS 
CHAVEZ V. CHAVEZ PAGE 25 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this, day of 
August, 2000: 
B.L. Dart 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger D. Sandack 
Attorney for Defendant 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tab 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
CASE NO. 974900264 
vs. : 
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, : 
Respondent. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Wednesday, the 12th, 13th, 14th and 
19th days of July, 2000, petitioner appearing in person and by her 
attorney, B.L. Dart and respondent appearing in person and by his 
attorney Roger D. Sandack, and the Court having received evidence 
from the testimony of witnesses, stipulations and exhibits and the 
matter having been argued and submitted and the Court taking the 
matter under advisement, the Court now being fully advised and 
incorporating all admitted exhibits, hereby makes the following 
findings. 
1. Petitioner and respondent were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the 3rd of February, 1978. 
2. Bott parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and have been for more than three months immediately prior to 
the filing of :his action for divorce. 
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3. This case has been bifurcated and a Decree of Divorce has 
heretofore been entered in this action under terms that all 
financial issues are to be determined as of the present as if no 
Decree of Divorce has been entered. 
4. The parties met each other when petitioner was 15 years 
of age and respondent was 19 years of age. At that time respondent 
was working for his father. Thereafter, respondent went on an LDS 
mission at age 21 while petitioner was still in high school. When 
respondent came back from his mission, petitioner was working at a 
dry cleaners and just out of high school. The parties were 
subsequently married on February 3, 1978, when petitioner was 19 
and respondent 23 years of age. 
5. There have been five children born as issue of said 
marriage, three of whom remain minors: Natalie Elizabeth Chavez, 
now age 21, born May 30, 1979; Erica Alison Chavez, now age 18, 
born February 21, 1982; Dennis Manuel Chavez, II, born December 5, 
1983; Max Daniel Chavez, born April 20, 1993; and Leo Chavez, born 
August 5, 1994. The oldest child, Natalie,- is a married, 
emancipated adult. The second child began residing with respondent 
in approximately November, 1999, and will finish her high school 
education in August, 2*000. Respondent has been providing Erica's 
support without contribution from petitioner since November, 1999. 
No evidence has been p "esented showing that either party is not a 
CHAVEZ V. CHAVEZ PAGE 3 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
fit and proper parent or that custody is an issue. Both parties 
are capable of being awarded the care, custody and control of their 
children. With respect to the remaining three children, the 
parties should be awarded joint legal care, custody and control of 
the minor children with petitioner being designated as the physical 
custodian. The parties previously agreed by stipulation that the 
children shall each have the right to choose and elect which parent 
they wish to reside with after they have reached the age of 15 
years. Each party shall have equal, reasonable rights to 
visitation with the children to visit at all reasonable times and 
places. In the event the parties are unable to agree on reasonable 
visitation, the standard visitation schedule contained in Utah Code 
Ann., Section 30-3-33 through -37 are to apply and be followed by 
the parties. 
6. During this marriage petitioner was effectively a 
housewife through most of the marriage (except for a nine month 
period when she was employed at Nordstroms), raising the children 
of the parties and this was her status at the time of the 
separation of the parties and the filing of this action for divorce 
in February, 1997. At the time of the filing of this action, 
petitioner was without employmei /t and without substantial post-high 
school education. She remainel at home caring for the children 
until May, 1999, when she enrolled at Skin Works, in a curriculum 
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to become an esthetician. She attended the training until October, 
1999, when she set up business in her home, providing esthetician 
services and retail sales. She received approximately $17,000 for 
services rendered at her home and has increased her inventories for 
her retail sales by approximately $9,000. She has provided 
evidence of her income from her home business for the first six 
months which reflects an average net monthly income of $1,081. 
(Pet. Ex. 23) In February, 2000, petitioner became employed as an 
esthetician by the Tree House Athletic Club Salon in Sandy, Utah. 
Between approximately February 25, 2000 and May 15, 2000, 
petitioner worked part-time earning gross income of $8,403 from her 
services and commissions from the Tree House Athletic Club Salon. 
Because of problems of caring for the children, her employment at 
the Tree House was terminated at the end of May, 2000. She 
anticipates taking another day spa position at the end of the 
summer when the children have returned to school, but the amount of 
income she will derive from that position is not yet known. 
7. Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses for her needs 
and necessities include the following: 
ITEM EXPENSE 
Automobile $ 144 
Charitable donations 8 
Child care 150 
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ITEM EXPENSE 
Clothing 
Dry cleaning 
Entertainment 
Cable TV 
Gifts 
Groceries 
Grooming 
Health club 
House payment 
Household miscellaneous 
Alarm 
Cleaning 
Repair 
Supplies 
Yard 
Magazines 
Medical, dental, Rx 
Recreation 
Taxes - Salt Lake County Assessor 
Reserve for income taxes 
Attorney's fees 
Vacat i on/trave1 
Automobile insurance 
Utilities 
Electricity 
Gas 
Sewage 
Telephone 
Water 
300 v 
52 
29 
100 
400 
75 
95 
775 
23 
100 
137 
16 
100 
6 
100 
38 
62 
250^ 
500 u 
78 
48 
102 
48 
12 
36 
3_3 
TOTAL $3,817 
8, Respondent, during this marriage has worked, primarily 
with and for his father in Chavez, Inc., a drywall and acoustical 
contractor, as a chief estimator, where he ha: earned a steady 
income. He has worked from the age of 11. He has attended the 
University of Utah and has served on ai LDS mission. From 1973 to 
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1°RC he was a junior estimator, proiect manager and lead esti mator 
for u»ysi f.'iit.i, I in,' I i. 11 in i in I'MM I I.I I i'ln" In-' A/as president of Noise 
Control, I in working on Emerson High School ui Wyoming, he 
encountei ed di f f 1»"u 11- y .111111 badl losse*" i| ,« i DM , i inn i i
 ( 11-j ;e„s 
tooV over and completed the project,, Respondent then audi is 
currently employed at Chavez Inc ill a base salary )1 $36,000 
( f i h i i . : h w i s | n I M i i H I II n i HI ui I ui in ui in I \ H i r f i i m i i I l i a v ^ , 1 II i n II mi 
addition, he receives bonuses, dividend, j i I other " benefits 
including health insurance, I he use of an automobi ] e :i nc] uding 
p a y nienl 111 i I I i \ p o n s t 1 i II i i HIIHM I 11 iiii I lliei: ew i t h . iii i: i c ] m l ;::ii i lg 
insurance, gasoline and maintenance, free membership at the Hidden 
'J a 1 ley Country Club w i I'M payment of aiinv expenses i incurred there, 
a n d I i'Yna I , IIII I iid i IIII|| I i 111 I n l lmni l n i n | h o i e a , I in i u p e jiiid b e v e r a ! 
trips to Mexico, primarily paid lot ny fhavez, Inc., or as a result 
of h is emp] oyment by Chavez I nr-. 
9 Respondent ' -» reasonable monthly expenses for h i s needs 
and necessities include the following: 
ITEM EXPENSES 
Housing and utilities n 
Taxes on home ^uu 
Food 300 
Clothes 100 
Entertainment 100 
Donations 50 
Medical/heal th 75 
Insurance 100 
Dry cleaning 60 
1, 
_L, 
75 
80 
7,5 
15 
75 
, 000 
000 
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ITEM EXPENSES 
Incidentals 
Visitation needs 
Home repair and ma intenance 
Subscriptions 
Gifts 
Attorneyf s fees 
Reserve for income taxes 
TOTAL $4,055 
10, There h.n lu en iiiiii i s s m in I Hi i .i id.;* i/ei j 11 il i \w\ I" he 
q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e a s s e t s owned by t h e p a r t i e s a r e m a r i t a l o r 
gi f t e d and wi th r e g a r d to t h a t
 l s s l l e a n c j t h e f a t h e r ' sou 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e C u u r t t mi ls as i o l l o w s : 
.1 That beg inn ing in 1976, r e s p o n d e n t ' s p a r e n t s began 
gi f t i nq tn rnr.ponrinnt if niiiull tin i i nt Inn i In i lulnni l i|H|ii ox imaf e] y 
25. J f p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t in t h e common s t o c k of- CIB C o r p o r a t i o n which 
s u b s e q u e n t l y r e o r g a n i z e d I n t o I 'havez, I in , .inil Hoi li1 i o 
Corpora 11111 in In 'Il I in i w i I t CM I ml I M I I hi I I in i i \ I | u i jpe i I , in ill 
b u i l d i n g which had 'UN-I.
 rr\\{ of C l l l ' b o p e r a t i o n s i n c e 197 "i Vhf-
, o u r t f u r- r ^ r f i n d s t h a t r e spond AT- +* has no m a n a g e r i a l i i n t e r e s t , 
i ::p :)i:: a t::ii ::: i i A c c o r • ::i :!i i l g II:: :: the 
testimony • respondent, Tony Chavez distributes royalty pay ments 
fror- nel i\xw at his aiscreiiua. The Court finds that to a certain 
p.-.- .- response; ;t was hirp<1 ^ prov i de some manageri < il control 
CHA< ffVA , "HAVhl". P A G E 8 F I N D I N G S h C O N C L U S I O N S 
ci »'J if t h * 1 i " I m i l ! innf mini • . l i e t u t i o i i n n n | l i n n D I yw. i I I I i i v i •• no i l oil: 
Chavez , In r ( fo r which tie r e c e i v e s a r e a s o n a b l e s a l a r y ) , however , 
t h e Court n o t e s that ' respondent , h i s l i t t l e , if <any c o n t r o l o v e r 
tin-1 i u nip lull | in nth I i 11*.* ii( hill iipuidl inn .i|if't it in «i I 1 j In I Minn il , 
and d o e s no t (a) a p p o i n t management; (b) d e t e r m i n e management 
c o m p e n s a t i o n p."1) M 1" pol l e y ; (d) i r q u i r o nr I i qui d a t e i s s e t s 
w i t h o u t I l ie s p e c i ! i o r.'onisenl nil I n s t i l l hen , ml i ,1 ..M J eo t I ms u i t s s e s ; 
o r (f) make a c q u i s ;i,t Ions Responden t r e p o r t s d i r e c t l y l i i s 
f a t h e r , t h e company ' s f o u n d e r , Ton1), »' A. Chavez, R e s p o n d e n t h a s two 
employees ulio r e p o r t t o Inn n a p p r e n t i c e e s t i m a t o r and an 
a s s i s t a n t c l e r k . 
C h a w I in ni]i h 11 a pi | n 11 * i m i t M I I I I I #H t 
division^; m, i i llio UniwaJl Division which assembles, sells ami 
installs a demountuble wall partition developed personally by Tony 
l l f l ' : r i " i " i ' ' ' i ,r n M I " " i i i n ' - i n t ; , I p t i l i 
commercial installation ot drywall, Respondent is employed by this 
division. 
The r e s p n n d e r i l in >t hn i in Il I ,ri t lll'uo I oriil' ni; I i n e x i I-'M :il 
50 p e r c e n t of t h e Chavez, I n c . s t o c k , Respondent ' h a s no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for f i i nanc inq , i nvo i n n q , b i l l i : p r e p a r a t i o n 
I iiiinup human i o?3( inn ffij
 ( payment of wages .. u. ^ . : , , j i o n 
of 32 o u t ot: t h e company ' s c u r r e n t )5 employee! '• i h i l e r e s p o n d e n t 
***
 a
 1 y t"f I' II y I' I i 1 1 . f •- i j » 
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most closely with the project superintendent; Dan Warath, who 
reports on a dail\ bam a lo I lie President, Tony Chavez, 
b During the course c; f the parties* marriage, 
respondei it's parpnti- :-\\n^ \ •' ' * '••'* i ] f - p p n « e j ' f '• hi-- ••i « ' '• i 
closely-held corporation known as Swanson Building Matei iais, inc. 
The Court: finds that this stock was gifted to respondent by 
i: e s p o n d e i 1 t ' ' s 1\a, r e n t" ,'•'. : . 11 m Il I II i « i II i e • | , » o 1 1 t i a " 111• «. \: a i a 11 III• • • t: i ia a, t e < I 
respondent equally with his other" siblings, The Coin f further 
finds that respondent has absolutely iio management or investment 
:: • € r I II i ;-, I e t • i, >s J t,J I I S . 11 • 11,11 e i w I 1" < in i t: • i 11 .:"-i w a 11 s i J 11 I \ i ,i i II t ,1, i r i c |i 
Materials, Inc., and, thus, all, distributions received from Swanson 
Building Materials other" than those contributed into the parties 1 
h o m e , i (iiiiiii! in in I, lit ,. i It-,1 a n d s e p a r a 11„» pi opert: y ot respondent , The 
Court further finds that Swanson"s will not distribute sufficient 
t.uture di str i but lone, of cash to perm i I a pi is 11 i ve cash I" I i ;i v 11 PI 
the potential, taxes to be imposed up mi I Ilia" hi 1.1 d istr lbut ion of 
dividends by reason of its subchapter S federal tax status, The 
C o u r t f u i r t l i ? r f i n d s tliiat" n;?spo>iiidfaii1' "a alia, I  ill ,. Il o sell il m I n„|i,jia,1a I e 
this interest LS governed by a shareholder agreement which controls 
In Mil be a, stockholder and offers a first right of refusal based 
u p o n I h e II: ; ' milk " »"a I in nil I In r D i i i p a i ry 
In reference to this finding, the Court is disturbed 
to note that $2,000,000 in excess dividends was paxu out from 
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January a r -u«^ December 31, !l,,;»99 (Pet, Ex, 22a), despite 
an independe g^ conducted annual l.y( -\ -controller 
overseeing the company finances, a Board of Directors having access 
t i' i imp. urn \ "" • b o o k r i iii in II .in HI i i mi in I I in in ill) ! j I i n q a ini ini IIa I II:::,aii,is i : e s . 
There appears tu be soma failure at duty on the part (if someone. 
Finally, a waiver of covenants on the banks1 J m e of credit I'DI: the 
1 • L i n MI , i ' n . in I in in in II i in I e i t. 11 in i ' . i f 111 . in III i n U P i mi i i i n • i i i i i l e o f 
cre« l i t t o be renewei I annua 1 i v 111 o r d e r I or r e l e a s e 11 f a u d i t e d 
f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t s seems t o sound an a l a r m t o anyone c o n n e c t e d 
w i t II in i • • 
Responden t h a s t a k e n t h e p o s i t i o n in t h i s a c t i o n 
t h a t moni e s p r o v i d e d h iro by hir. f a t h e r t o a s s i s t t h e p a r t i e s 11 t h e 
e o n s t i uc t::i cu: I of t Dimple I in 1 I wnrti borrowed fun ii s and 
t h a t t h o s e funds e v i d e n c e d lit i p r o m i s s o r y n o t e i s s t i l l an 
oh I Iqatic: '1 , "J1'1, i • "h \ :: onf • v m b l " " " • i " * i " "vJ • M1 i1 " h *\ e«, 
when f i r s t p i o v j d e d were e v i d e n c e d b\ a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e in t h e 
amount of $b8,200J I d a t e d J u n e JO, 198J , and due and p a y a b l e on t h e 
JO1 h d a ,' u I I  I i mi i «i», 1 "J Ml . I I i ' I I I N 1 I  p d i I p a y m e n ! n i l . I " H M I 
was made May If), 1984. The t a c t s I|M IIDI s u p p o r t r e s p o n d e n t ' s 
pos i t ion * h. 11 fr h I 3 i » b l i g a t i o n i s s t i 11 o u t s t and! nq a s II i s r 1 e a r 
Ihiil l l i r ,d i t u t f ! 11 'ippi I I c .ill 1 i • I 11 Mil1 pi i J 10 i '..tfnr y muile 
i s a s i x - y e a r s t a t u t e of L i m i t a t i o n s which ran un J u n e 30, 11990 
o v e r t e n year s a g o . A l s o , t h e f a c t s do not s u p p o r t r e s n o n d e n l ""i 
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cunt , e n t J on t h e r e y ivirs i in u <i II mud i I. i c a l , i on Il, t h e |;jii:onii j b i H" { m u t e . 
The e f f e c t i s that: the ob l iga t ion is not en fo rceab l e and the 
$58,200 e f f e c t i v e I "j brccamo .1 g i f t to the p a r t i e s with the innning 
of the s t a t ut e o I; 1 1 m i t a 11011s. 
d . This i s a m a r r i a g e of ,.!() y e a r s which I s more t h a n 
h H i t i Mm-51"' •-' I MM I'IIIII IIII] win 1 i.ii 111 #•' 1 HiiTid ! m-»d home 
as a s t a y - a t - h o m e w i f e , r a i s i n g t h e f i v e c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s . 
e . The p a r t i e s 1 l i f e revolved around respondent's 
e in/ in I In <" In 1  '* ; , I in 1111 II III in mi 1 I i I 11 i i i . s l i i p w i I In In 1 s I . i t h M r
 r 
Tony Chave? ft I I it 1 he vacations ol the parties were planned to 
coincide with family trips paid for by Tony Chavez, including the 
t r i p s II IMI1»,« in 1 11» hi in in 1  • [ inn in in 11 II I In 111 111 nil 1II I 11I w l i 11 "Hi w e t H« | M M . I I o r 
by Chavez, ] ne , or as a result of the work of Chavez, Inc. These 
trips usually were family affairs wit In brothers and sisters cormntf 
along, whuh were organized and substantially paid tut: by Tony 
Chavez and his wife, Nancy, or Chavez Inc. 
D e s p 11 H t h e n'Yimt t " . I 1 IIIIIKJ 1 nm | 1 11 iiiiii I II 1 i lhn iVM 
relating fu respondent's responsibilities will,h Chavez, line there 
is also evidence of respondent's more active role in the Company, 
- - i M I w 1 I In i h r i \*H * II in 1 ^  1 I n 1 1 in 1 1 l II In 11 M I u \* \ in 1 11 i v H I or 
; e t u r n i n g front .-1 m i s s i o n ; inicxl t o Tony C h a v e z , he 1 . t h e o n l y 
member of I'rmy C h a v p z ' s f a m i l y who i s r i c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d 111 IIMI.T / 
11 ic ; r 1 e > I I 11 I 111 in j. in 111 III« J 111 •) 1 1111 v e z , In i s I 11 e L a r g e s t s h a 1; e h o 1 d e 1; 
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i n Shaver Trie ainrll De l H i n * i n i l e t t e r d a t e d II M / H * I undko t h e 
i lid nz, Jin I i»l I ei IHMII i i ' l ill MIL) In p a s s i n g ut J l e s o l u l ion 1^ I h<» 
Board of D i r e c t o r s , Tony Chavez i s L i s t e d a s P r e s . and Denn i s a s 
" V I Pet rv r'' i , B<ink i in*1 account" #1 V 7 - 44 ' > ] i s t ,«•. a c c o u n t 
h o J d e r s a s I i nt i liavez and Dennis Chavez \^\ ' / J I B b a l a n c e a ol 
4/5/IK), Del Ix Hi! ' Bank One account #1128-4233 Del Rio accoun t 
I i 'it i as in i Miiiii! Iin 11 der M< inn i h«i K»/ iml f inr rh.iwp,1' i * in, ini <-<>) 
and <i w i t h d r a w a l a! ;> 11 , U i I Ui a s ol 4/211/110, LJet, Ix I I .i 
K e y m a n / U n i v e r s a l L i f e I n s u r a n c e w i t h Gene ra l American I n s u r a n c e in 
I 1 M II II I II II ill i HI I mi 11 II in II I hi mi I III II i ( » i ii ii 11 C I i n " i i 1 in i t t i ' c d in mi in II i i i i i i I I in in mi in fill 
beneficial^ listed as Chavez, Inc. iFtd Ix ' a* pp. • 81 ; and a 
letter from Dad and Mom to Dennis (datH nbl iterated) stating, "I in 
s e i , i i HIM H i mi II H I I 11 iff n i l j II H I II II in nil I I  i I i in I | i 11111)1* , in HI i u i II w I n II i I I | i j i I hi 
your d i v o r c e p roceec imq and HI I I thp o t h e r p r o b l e m s pniii have in 
r u n n i n g ou r b u s i n e s s iunder I i n r for omphasin , P e t . Lx. bbj V 
t h e chief ciit lmatm Ini i h,r«n , lllliii IK must have a t h o r o u g h 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ol I ln> i c t u a l c o s t s nil b i d d i n g for work t o be 
p e r f o r m e d , a v e r y c r i t i c a l o p e r a t i o n oil t in company I HI, CIM ;*-V 
h a s a s e r i o u s c a n c e r prol i lem and Lhe on I y l o g i c a l s u c c e s s o r t o I uny 
i s Dennis b a s e d on the above o b s e r v a t i o n s I in m i l s i s i n t e l l i g e n t 
inn c f n nil it <» IIMI i I | MI 1111 ini lipoid!" i nq MHi I 11 n (lint it«i ei I Ii in 
a t t r i b u t e d lu hum in I he t i j . i l t e s t i m o n y His c u r r e n t s a l a r y d o e s 
n o t r e f j ' a c t t h i s . 
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f. The parties went f'o their in-laws1 home at Ip.iri" twu 
wnnlcpnds i'i niinimfh tnr hnrhrruen iinl laintl\ i| i !;h(-.j i inijb iiml swimming. 
g. Respondent would confide more with his father than 
with petitioner mi HI I I financial affairs. 
h. Tfu Mi .I i (isidein i rfas a duplex owned by Tony 
Chavez and their next residence on Dimple Dell was one in which 
Tony Chavez was involved n. iii.il' iiii, Hit I-1 • TI.SI In I- II I m , 
1! !'"etJ tiont r Jiitroduced evidence reilecting l.lie income 
earned and received by the parties which effectively was without 
a i i/y :ii nn 'i HID • T i n 1 i mi iiiiiin1 i i I I p</t n d t* In I Il I j i my 
fig uresi 
1994 $192,305 
1995 334,594 
1996 2 3 5,97] 
1997 186,926 
1998 159,555 
1999 .] 93 669 
The average annual" i ncome for the past four year s of 199 6 
through 1 9 99 i s $1 94,03 0 a year, or $:i 6,169 a month, 
Tliei: e M as tes t ii mc i: \y :i i id I c a t i i I ::j t ha t a p o r t i on ; . nrome 
d e r i ved from Swansoi i, l i i c , i i i t h e for: ' l i v i d end,* 
e f f e e t i v e 3 y be r e d u c e d by 5 0 % :i i I t: he fI I I::i ire 
for those four years total $421 ,559 or $8, . ., . d a c . jiui-, 
t e s t i m o n y q J ven at l:t i d J , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e s e d i v i d e n d s w 
i i IIII I In t" ml II r f • 111 i-i111 II in, in * o b i . ' o n i I I I I  in 11 in I 
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was testimony that since Swannon is \ subchapter S ci irporation 
s u b b t a n 1 1 a J I i, in I I  11 I I I i I 11 i j, 1 i i I n mi L m i ih. w i I I h e u s e e J t u 111 t s e t 
federal and state income taxes imposed on respondent's share of al L 
corporate profits. 
1 2. Duri rig the marriage the parties have acquired substantial 
assets and those assets shou Id be awarded as follows: 
REAL PROPERTY DEN NIS TAMEE 
House and real property at ] 1 77 Bear $2b&#686 
Ho] Il :::)¥"' Ci :i : c J e Di: ap< =ii: II T Webber 
appraisal $350,000 , ] ess mortgage 
7/7/ 00 $33,314 == equity of $266,686 
BUSINESS/PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
Chavez, Inc. - 10,326.68 shares or 
2 5 2 3 % 
Del Rio Corporatior i - ^ J , ^ / O . O 8 
shares or ,<: », j /% 
S va r iso! I El] in :ii ] d :! i lg Mater i a I 3. I i ic „ -
1250 shares or 6%,- Denn-i f*1 
interest $23^.152 
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DENNIS TAMEE 
Intermountaiii Advisory Services, 
Inc shares (involuntarily 
dU-., • ) 
RGL Investments (in son's name) 
INVESTMENT AND BANK ACCOUNTS 
Dean Witter #052779 (stmt 5/31/00) 
( d t t:er ttn|i,-jt ill i H I I ',i I , /'I'I ) 
Bank One # 3 0 1 7 - 5 3 9 7 ( s t m t s / n / 0 0 ) 
P • I'i,1 | Lit till li/ I '»/ III I) 
Bank One #132 7-447 "1 Tony & D e n n i s C h a v e z 
( s t m t 4 / 5 / 1 ( $ 4 7 , ' i l l ) | III HI ) 
Draper Bank, checking, Tamee (personal) 
Draper Bank, , Tameo (busiDPRS) 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
) 
Lean Witter i kA ?u . .>8 •'"-.t::v. . : '•, 21,612 
$1F ''61 
018 
pass-thru 
l-'ai,--, I In u 
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PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1 
1990 Mitsubishi Montero in 
1983 Honda 2 50' cc motorcycle 
tss ,St r ".'."din be hi I. 
Furniture and furnishings 
(Family affairs appraisal) 
DENNIS 
'.; mi "I, r BO 
500 
5,800 
295 
TAMEE 
600 
6,000 
LIFE INSURANCE 
Grea t Wes te r i i I .i fe $500. 000 
(Res, To conti nue payment) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
I n t e r v ivos t r u s t 
Engagement i inq f Lori C h r i s t i a n 
;•'•-•• 1 1 j j. i i imi in in in i in i i il I ill i 
o e l o n g s ' D Chavez, I n c . ) 
$100 , 000 11 iiin • in Chavez , i n c . 
S u s a n C a 11 a q h e r d e I > I 
y , , , 5 0 
50 00 0 
( h , l W J ) 
$ 5 0 , 0 0 0 
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DENNIS TAMEE 
Marital debt (promissory note 
to Tony Chavez, gift) 
(considered a non-existing debt) -
TOTAL $265,332 $354,898 
NET DISTRIBUTION $265,332 $354,898 
It should be noted that if all the amounts not included 
in respondent's assets were included, respondent's total 
distribution would be $846,461. That amount is his minimum net 
worth at this time. That is almost double of petitioner's 
distribution. 
The Court finds that respondent has had the benefit of the 
$100,000 loan to Chavez, Inc. and that he should be obligated to 
pay petitioner $50,000 as her portion of this asset as reflected in 
the Distribution of Assets set forth above. 
13. Based upon the foregoing assumptions of income and 
property division, the Court finds that respondent should pay, 
pursuant to split custody child support worksheet (See, Rehm v. 
Rehm, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 8), and petitioner's income of $1,081 per 
month and respondent's income historically of $8,7 \2 (which, in the 
opinion of the Court, is a better reflection o^f respondent's 
average income and his income stream in tne future, rather than his 
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current reduced income of $36,000 annually, and taking into 
consideration a purported 50% reduction in Swanson, Inc. 
dividends), to petitioner as child support for the three minor 
children of the parties commencing with the month of August, 2000, 
the sum of $1,297 per month. 
So long as respondent has an obligation to pay child 
support he should continue to provide medical and health insurance 
as provided through his employment and each of the parties should 
be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical, dental, 
orthodontia and counseling expenses. 
14. Where gifted property, which includes practically all of 
the income-generating sources enjoyed by the parties during their 
marriage is awarded one spouse, the remaining property need not 
necessarily be divided equally. Such as in this case, there is 
need to provide for the petitioner adequate income to enable her to 
begin her post-marital life with some degree of economic self-
sufficiency. In the Matter of the Marriage of Pierson. 653 P.2d at 
1262 (1982); also, there is need to fairly "divide the economic 
assets and income stream of the parties so as to permit both to 
maintain themselves after the marriage as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Mortcnsen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 6 (Zimmerman concurring). i1though 
respondent claims their living standards during tneir marriage was 
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modest, that is contradicted by his father's letter to him dated 
4/3/99 wherein he states, "We were patient with you and Tammee as 
we knew you were trying to get a good start. I believe you had 
enough funds to pay this note but instead you and Tammee started to 
live like very rich people, and spending like there was no tomorrow 
(sic).11 (See Pet. Ex. 64) Petitioner's testimony also supports 
her contention that the family enjoyed a very comfortable 
lifestyle. 
In addition, respondent's position allows for no 
consideration, in the marriage or for the production of income, of 
the role of a housewife and mother. It should be noted that the 20 
years of her marriage to respondent were primarily the most 
productive years of her life. Although, petitioner was neither a 
stockholder or employee of Chavez, Inc., she was a partner in the 
"business" of marriage and should share in its benefits, as stated 
in the Dunn case, "While she was not a partner in the business of 
orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the "business' of 
marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth 
of his practice and the business. As such, she is entitled to her 
fair share in any marital assets derived from their joint efforts 
in the endeavor." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
Likewise, respondent was able to develop his skills, increase his 
knowledge and expand his business contacts and become an integral 
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part of Chavez, Inc. from which he will increasingly benefit from 
for many, many years to come and provide for him a very comfortable 
lifestyle. Although relating to the division of property, the same 
can be said of alimony awards, when the Appellate Court stated, 
"The lower court's approach to marital property distribution is 
troublesome as it suggests a weighing only of each partnerfs 
financial contribution to the marriage. Such analysis ignores the 
contributions of love, encouragement, and companionship, which 
elude monetary valuation. Such an analysis also gives short shrift 
to spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child care." Dunn 
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1324 at 5 (Utah App. 1990). 
Unfortunately, the gradual, dramatic and precipitous drop 
in salary and dividends, relegation of his job position to a minor 
role in the company, the demand for the payment of the promissory 
note, the imputing of income to petitioner who is barely trying to 
establish herself and still care for three minor children and 
failing to attribute any contribution made by petitioner to the 
marriage, simultaneously occurring at the time of the divorce 
proceedings suggests more than mere coincidence, a scenario of 
possible orchestration intimated by petitioner. Putting it another 
way, if respondent were petitioner and petitioner were respondent, 
would this scenario cause any concern? It does cause this Court 
concern and should be factored into any award given, particularly 
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child support, alimony and attorney fees. This is not a criticism 
of any party because proponents and opponents must necessarily 
protect their best interests at the time of trial and no one can be 
faulted. This is the dilemma the Court must consider judiciously, 
fairly and equitably. 
The Court has considered the needs of the petitioner; the 
earning capacity of the petitioner; the ability of the respondent 
to provide support; and, the length of the marriage as required by 
case and statutory law in Utah and finds "alimony is appropriate." 
Rehm v. Rehm, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. Based on the foregoing, other 
considerations suggested by this Court and the current financial 
circumstances of the parties, petitioner should be awarded alimony 
from respondent in the amount of $1,200 per month for a period of 
15 years, considering the length of the marriage and the lifestyle 
enjoyed by the parties during that time, or until such time as 
petitioner remarries, cohabits or the death of either party. It 
should be noted that respondent has already remarried despite his 
alleged reduction of income. 
15. So long as there is an obligation for child support or 
alimony, respondent should continue to maintain in force his 
currently held policy of life insurance in the face amount of 
$500,000, with petitioner and the minor children as beneficiaries 
thereon. 
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16. Petitioner should pay and be responsible for the first 
mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1177 Bear 
Hollow Circle, Draper, Utah, in the approximate amount of $83,314. 
Respondent should pay the obligation owing to Susan Gallagher for 
the painting on the marital home in the amount of $6,572. 
Otherwise, each of the parties should be ordered to assume and pay 
any obligations which he or she has individually incurred since the 
filing of this divorce action in January, 1997, or which has been 
incurred in connection with any asset which he or she is awarded. 
17. It has been necessary for petitioner to retain an 
attorney to represent her in this action. The Court finds, based 
on the evidence introduced during trial, that petitioner is without 
sufficient funds with which to pay all of her attorney's fees in 
this action, that respondent does have the funds and resources to 
pay the attorney fees, and that the attorney fees are reasonable 
considering the extensive time and effort expended by petitioner's 
counsel in discovery and four days of trial time. Rehm v. Rehm, 
3 63 Adv. Rep. 8. 
Petitioner was initially represented by John Anderson of 
Anderson and Karrenberg to represent her, incurring attorney's fees 
in the amount of $3,523.80, which amount has been paid by 
petitioner. 
CHAVEZ V. CHAVEZ PAGE 23 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Since the withdrawal of John Anderson, petitioner has 
been represented by the firm of Dart, Adamson & Donovan, and the 
Court finds that the time spent and the expenses incurred by them 
were necessarily incurred and are reasonable in amount. This 
amount is $47,230.18. 
The only amount paid against these fees are $5,000, 
leaving a remaining balance of $42,230.18. In addition, petitioner 
has incurred expert witness fees in the amount of $8,624.38. The 
Court finds that based upon the differential of income between the 
parties and the differences in their financial resources, as well 
as the testimony of the parties regarding their marital history and 
divorce proceedings, it is reasonable that petitioner should be 
awarded her unpaid attorney's fees and costs incurred in this 
action in the amount of $38,713.64, or three-fourths of the amount 
prayed for by petitioner. 
18. Petitioner should be restored her maiden name of 
Gatherum. 
19. From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court hereby enters Conclusions of Law consistent with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
Dated this «=£> day of October, 2000. 
J£± 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this ^> day of October, 2000: 
B.L. Dart 
Attorney for Petitioner 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger D. Sandack 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 S, Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
l£d 
Tab 3 
B.L. DART (818) 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, 
Petitioner, : ORDER SUPPLEMENTING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. : 
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, : Civil No. 974900264 
Respondent. : Judge Anne M. Stirba 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday and Wednesday, the 12th, 13th, 14th and 19th days of July, 2000, petitioner appearing in 
person and by her attorney, B.L. Dart and respondent appearing in person and by his attorney, 
Roger D. Sandack, and the Court having received evidence from the testimony of witnesses, 
stipulations and exhibits and the matter having been argued and submitted and the Court taking 
the matter under advisement, the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 The Decree of Divorce has previously been entered in this action. This 
Oder supplemer>ts the Decree of Divorce. 
2. The parties are awarded the joint legal care, custody and control of their 
three minor children, to wit: Dennis Manuel Chavez, born December 5, 1983; Max Daniel 
Chavez, born April 20, 1993 and Leo Chavez, born August 5, 1994, with petitioner being 
designated as the physical custodian. The parties have previously agreed by stipulation that the 
children shall each have the right to choose and elect which parent they wish to reside with after 
they have reached the age of 15 years. Each party shall have equal, reasonable rights of 
visitation with the children to visit at all reasonable times and places. In the event the parties are 
unable to agree on reasonable visitation, the standard visitation schedules contained in Utah Code 
Ann., Section 30-3-33 through 30-3-37 are to apply and be followed by the parties. 
3. Commencing with the month of August, 2000, respondent is ordered to 
pay child support to petitioner in the sum of $1,297 per month for the three minor children of the 
parties. 
So long as respondent has an obligation to pay child support he is ordered 
to provide medical and health insurance as provided through his employment and each of the 
parties is ordered to be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical, dental, orthodontia 
and counseling expenses. 
4. Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to petitioner, commencing with the 
month of September, 2000, in the amount of $1,200 a month for a period of 15 years, or until 
such time as petitioner remarries, cohabits or the death of either party. 
5. So long as there is an obligation for child support or alimony, respondent 
is ordered to continue to maintain in force his currently held policy of life insurance in the face 
amount of $500,000, with petitioner and the minor children as beneficiaries thereon. 
2 
6. The assets of the parties are awarded as follows with the award to each 
party to be free of any claim of the other. 
a. Petitioner is awarded the house and real property at 1177 Bear 
Hollow Circle, Draper, Utah, subject to her assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage 
obligation owing thereon 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Inc. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
account #1327-4473. 
J. 
k. 
1. 
Respondent is awarded his stock in Chavez, Inc. 
Respondent is awarded his stock in Del Rio Corporation. 
Respondent is awarded his stock in Swanson Building Materials, 
Respondent is awarded his Dean Witter account #052779. 
Respondent is awarded his Bank One account #3017-5397. 
Respondent is awarded his Bank One account #0002-9452. 
Respondent is awarded any interest which he has in Bank One 
Petitioner is awarded her personal Draper Bank checking account. 
Petitioner is awarded her business Draper Bank checking account. 
Respondent is awarded his Dean Witter IRA account #037707. 
Petitioner is awarded her Dean Witter IRA account #037708. 
m. Respondent is awarded the 1995 Astro van. 
Petitioner is awarded the 1990 Mitsubishi Montero 4D. 
Responder t is awarded the 1983 Honda 250cc motorcycle. 
Respondent is awarded the 1990 17.5 ft. Glass Stream boat. 
q. Each party is awarded all furniture, furnishings, appliances and 
other personal property currently in his or her own possession. 
r. Respondent is awarded the Great Western Life Insurance policy, 
subject to his obligation to maintain it in force, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5 above. 
s. Respondent is awarded the engagement ring to Lori Christian. 
t. Respondent is awarded the proceeds from the payment of the 
$100,000 loan to Chavez, Inc., subject to respondent payment $50,000 to petitioner for her 
portion and petitioner is hereby awarded a judgment against respondent in the amount of 
$50,000, to bear interest at the judgment rate until paid. 
7. Petitioner is ordered to pay and be responsible for the first mortgage 
obligation on the house and real property at 1177 Bear Hollow Circle, Draper, Utah, in the 
approximate amount of $83,314. Respondent is ordered to pay the obligation owing to Susan 
Gallagher for the painting on the marital home in the amount of $6,572. Otherwise, each of the 
parties is ordered to assume and pay any obligations which he or she has individually incurred 
since the filing of this divorce action in January, 1997, or which has been incurred in connection 
with any asset which he or she is awarded. 
8. Petitioner is awarded a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount of $38,713.54, to bear interest at the judgment rate until paid. 
9. Petitioner is restored to her maiden name of Tamee Anne Gatherum. 
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10. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and perform any acts 
necessary to effectuate and carry out the terms of this Order Supplementing Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this <5 day of Septeaateer, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
JLkl 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
Senior District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROGER D. SANDACK 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of September, 2000,1 mailed a copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Roger D. Sandack 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 South Main Street, #400 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
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Roger D. Sandack, Esq. (#2856) 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)533-8383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, 
Respondent. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 974900264DA 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Commissioner Michael Evans 
Comes now Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, Roger D. 
Sandack, and respectfully objects to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce to be entered in the above-entitled action as follows: 
Respondent objects to the following Findings of Fact: 
1. Finding No. 7 - related to Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenditures. On 
page 5 of this Court's Memorandum decision, the Court specifically made findings of 
Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses for her needs and necessities from Exhibit 24 
and as adjusted by her testimony and the Courts evaluation of the evidence. The Court 
specifically found $2,719 for Petitioners needs and necessities, it is improper for 
Petitioner to now include items which were not presented to this Court and were not 
subject to cross examination, solely to enhance their arguments on appeal. Petitioner 
included over $1,000 in attorney fees as monthly expenses regardless of the 
substantial award she received for fees and costs, and regardless of the specific 
notation by the Court recognizing that attorney fees were not included in monthly 
expenses. Petitioner included sums for taxes when no testimony was presented, no 
findings made by the Court and regardless of the speculative nature of taxes to be 
imposed. Petitioner unilaterally increased this Court's specific finding of monthly needs 
from $2,719 per month to $4,667 per month. The Petitioner's disregard for this Court's 
Decision and her belief, given this Court's favorable ruling, that the Court will approve 
any changes unilaterally made, have required Respondent to file these Objections at 
substantial, additional legal expense. Petitioner should be sanctioned and Respondent 
should be awarded attorney fees for having to respond to Petitioner's improper conduct. 
2. Respondent objects to the last full paragraph of Finding No. 12, on page 14, 
for the reason that no such finding was made by this Court, and no such evidence was 
offered or received. Petitioner's claim totally failed during the presentation of the 
testimony and this Court made no determination that a debt from Chavez Inc. to 
Respondent exists, or that Respondent dissipated any asset. In fact, Respondent 
came to Court ready, willing and able to trace all expenditures, but Petitioner's attorney 
simply failed to ask these questions. Respondent would be highly prejudiced if the 
Court allows Petitioner to now re-write the decision according to her whim. This 
includes the Petitioner's post trial research and her attempts to justify the existence of 
an asset or claim that does not exist. Respondent is highly prejudiced since he was 
precluded from presenting evidence demonstrating Petitioner's claim was non-existent. 
Petitioner should be reminded that the $100,000 was received by Respondent in 1995, 
F \USERS\LJC\chavez\object findings wpd 2 
and paid back to Respondent in 1996 long before he separated on December 28, 1996. 
The Court may remember that the books of Chavez, Inc. shows no debt owing to 
Respondent at the end of 1996. Those funds were deposited in Respondent's Dean 
Witter accounts, not the Bank One Account which Petitioner's attorney asked about in 
his failed attempt to determine where the money was deposited or spent. No questions 
were asked about the Dean Witter accounts even though all such accounts were 
available to Petitioner's attorney and had been since before his first deposition. 
3. Respondent objects to paragraph 16 of the Findings to the extent the Court 
is requiring Respondent to pay an obligation to a third party which he had nothing to do 
with and which has not been proven or demonstrated as being a legitimate debt of 
Petitioner or Respondent. 
4. Respondent objects to said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce to the extent they fail to reflect the parties stipulation that child support and 
alimony be retroactive to January, 2000. 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent further objects to the entry of 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce to the extent the same are inconsistent 
with this Court's rulings. 
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DATED this A day of September, 2000. 
By: 
A A 
/ A - •: / - - " - A 
Rogerb. Sandackv £$q. 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)533-8383 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF 
DIVORCE was mailed, postage pre-paid, on the A "day of September, 2000, to the 
following: 
B.L Dart, Esq. 
DART, ADAMSON, DONOVAN & HANSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
310 South Main Street, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A 
• / 
/ 
/ A 
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Ityrb 3utitciai district Court 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Telephone (801) 238-7300 
October 2 , 2000 
B.L. Dart, Esq. 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
oger D. Sandack, Esq. 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Tamra Anne Chavez v. Dennis M. Chavez 
Case No. 974900264 
Dear Counsel: 
The Court has reviewed the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, as submitted by Mr. Bert Dart, and 
also has reviewed the Objections to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and after considering both, the Court has 
revised the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, taking into 
consideration the total property distributions to each of the 
parties and trying to achieve the fairest and most equitable 
division possible 
I have attempted to preserve the goose that lays the golden 
egg by keeping intact Chavez, Inc. Tony Chavez worked very hard to 
establish Chavez, Inc. His intention appears to be to keep the 
company within the family. The Court has taken great pains to 
respect his intent. Thus, in the property division the ability to 
maintain respondent's adequate lifestyle, as well as petitioner's 
lifestyle was attempted. In attempting to preserve his income 
stream and allowing petitioner to share in what she should be 
entitled to, the Court has tried to be fair to both sides. In the 
long run, respondent will continue to have his income stream intact 
and hopefully petitioner will have the opportunity to establish 
herself and become self-sufficient. Respondent, over time, will be 
able to recoup any losses he may feel he has temporarily sustained 
and from this property division should be able to reestablish 
himself in the future. 
A 
Counsel of record -2- October 2f 2 000 
Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter, 
Very truly yours, 
Raymond S. Uno 
Senior District Court Judge 
RSU:jsh 
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Roger D. Sandack, Esq. (#2856) 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)533-8383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, ) 
Petitioner, ) RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 974900264DA 
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, ) 
) Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Respondent. ) Commissioner Michael Evans 
Comes now Respondent, by and through his attorney, Roger D. Sandack, and 
respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for a new trial to be granted on the issue of whether the parties are owed an 
asset from Chavez, Inc. in the amount of $100,000 or whether Respondent dissipated 
said loan proceeds. 
This Motion is based upon insufficiency of evidence to justify the Court finding 
that such an asset exists, or that Respondent dissipated any asset, that the award to 
Petitioner is excessive, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, and that the award is an error of fact and law. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Rule 59 
Motion for New Trial filed herewith and the pleadings and exhibits previously received 
by this Court. 
As an alternative, Respondent moves this Court pursuant to Rule 59(e) to alter 
or amend the judgment by deleting the $100,000 non-existent loan from Chavez, Inc. 
from the distribution to the parties. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that the Court open the judgment to take 
additional testimony, amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and make new 
Findings and Conclusions and a new judgment consistent with the evidence and 
testimony submitted at trial and herewith. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2000. 
1214 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL was hand delivered on the day of October, 2000, to the following: 
B.L. Dart, Esq. 
DART, ADAMSON, DONOVAN & HANSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA ANNE CHAVEZ, 
Petitioner- Appellee, 
DENNIS M. CHAVEZ, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
Court of Appeals No. 20000970DA 
District Court No. 974900264DA 
Volume IV of IV 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 7^2001 
«ACf LAKE OOUNTVJ 
BENCH TRIAL JULY 12,, 13, 14 AND 19 2000 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
ORIGINAL 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
1 A Don't have the money. 
2 Q Hidden Valley Country Club is in your, is titled in 
3 your name, is that correct? 
4 A It needs to be. Hidden Valley does not recognize 
5 corporate memberships. 
6 Q The amount that you paid for your engagement ring was 
7 $7,750? 
8 A According to your documentation, yes. 
9 Q And now Chavez, Inc. You loaned money to Chavez, 
10 Inc., back in 1995, did you not? 
11 A I return, yes I did. 
12 Q And the tax return shows that you had loaned money to 
13 them. In fact, you'd moved into the house by 1996. I guess my 
14 question to you is what did, what happened to the $100,000? 
15 A You'd have to check the documents. 
16 Q Well, what's your, what's your recall at this time 
17 that happened to the $100,000? 
18 A I deposited it. 
19 Q And what happened to it after you deposited it? 
20 A I expended it. 
21 Q So 100,000 is just all gone now? 
22 A I don't know. You -
23 Q Did, let me just ask you this, did you buy furniture, 
24 furnishings to set up your housekeeping? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q That's what you testified yesterday. But how come 
2 then the furniture and furnishings that the appraiser looked at 
3 only came to $260? 
4 A For me? 
5 Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 A You asked a general question if I've bought 
7 furnishings. You didn't give a time table. If you're 
8 addressing my personal purchases -
9 Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 A Yes, I did buy some things, but they were gifts from 
11 my father. My father furnished my apartment. 
12 Q And you have those furniture and furnishings still? 
13 A They are being used by the apartment. Just so 
14 you'll, give you a little background if you wouldn't, wouldn't 
15 mind. 
16 Q Well, I'm curious to know why when the appraiser goes 
17 to look at your furniture and furnishings they only come up 
18 with $260. 
19 A Because that's all I have to my assets. 
20 Q So you segregated out what you felt was gifted from 
21 what -
22 A My father furnished the apartment. Because I wanted 
23 to meet my obligations to my children and to maintain the 
24 exist, their, their home that they're living in. I built an 
25 apartment, or my father had built an apartment in my warehouse 
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1 where I lived. He furnished it. They're still sitting there. 
2 Q You still own them there? 
3 A I don't own them. They belong to my father. He 
4 allowed me to use them. 
5 Q Well, didn't you -
6 MR. SANDACK: Counsel, we're talking about two 
7 different subjects. I just want to make the record clear. 
8 You're not asking him about furniture purchased with the 
9 $100,000, are you? 
10 MR. DART: Actually I am. I'm trying to get a sense 
11 of that and he said -
12 MR. SANDACK: Well, let's get some, some foundation 
13 then, because the timing's a little wrong I think. 
14 MR. DART: Well let's, time is short. 
15 Q (BY MR. DART) You testified yesterday that you used 
16 some of this $100,000 to buy furniture and furnishings for 
17 yourself, did you not? 
18 A I did not. I said I bought, you have to remember the 
19 time. The time is 1996. I was still married at that time. 
20 The furnishings that I purchased went into that home. 
21 Q Let me call your attention to Exhibit 67. 
22 A All right. 
23 MR. DART: Has that been introduced yet? 
24 COURT CLERK: No. 
25 Q (BY MR. DART) This is a subpoenaed record of your 
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bank account after the divorce is filed, after your, bought any 
furniture you're buying for the house, and that shows that you 
had in that bank account $80,000; did you not? 
A In 1997. 
Q And that's after, yeah, after the divorce is filed. 
The face sheet is a recap, but all the statements of those 
figures are underneath and the March 31st statement in here 
shows that you had in that account $88,325. 
A Correct. 
Q Where did all that money go? 
A Where did the $80,000 go? 
Q Yeah, where'd the 80,000 go? You just spend it? 
A $80,000, I've still got 19,000. 
Q So where did the 60, difference go? 
A To your client. 
Q Well, except you're earning a salary during this 
period of time, you're getting dividends from -
MR. SANDACK: Your, Your Honor, I've got to object to 
this. He's now asking him to account for every dime that 
occurred over not just a two year period, but up til now, which 
is a three and a half year period. They've got all the 
documentation. They've got all of the deposits and they've got 
all of the checks. For him to simply respond to that as a 
question now and make it appear as though he's hiding something 
is inappropriate. 
632 
MR. DART: I submit that Mrs. Chavez was being 
questioned down to the gnat's eye. 
MR. SANDACK: And I don't mind you doing that, as 
long as you're showing something and go through the process. 
But you're asking him in one question to explain where 
everything's gone over a three and a half year period. 
MR. DART: All I, I'm just using big round figures, 
because that's all I've got available is this documentation -
MR. SANDACK: That -
MR. DART: - and I submit that he should have answers 
for it. 
MR. SANDACK: And I'll object to that. That's not 
all you've got available. You've got every check that was ever 
written from this account and we've produced those. 
MR. DART: Your Honor, this is, this again is cross 
examination of this witness and he has the right on redirect to 
clarify any part of that and I submit -
MR. SANDACK: I'm simply clarifying statements you're 
making to the Court, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But I did see copies of checks that were 
written on accounts. Are they available? 
MR. SANDACK: Absolutely. 
MR. DART: Those checks are -
THE COURT: Are they on an exhibit somewhere? 
MR. DART: Again -
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THE COURT: That might help him account for some of 
the expenditures -
MR. DART: Well, let -
THE COURT: I'm not sure what exhibits they are. 
MR. DART: We'll first of all, we'll offer Exhibit 67 
showing that as of, of March of 1998 he had $80,000 in the 
savings account. 
MR. SANDACK: Well, for that limited purpose I have 
no objection. 
MR. DART: Okay. 
THE COURT: May be admitted. 
(Exhibit 60 received) 
MR. DART: Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. DART) After this date, you say you've used 
this money for support, but after this date you've been getting 
big dividends from Swanson, have you not, that are not in this 
$80,000 figure? 
A Everything that I've got from Swanson's been 
deposited. 
Q But, but I'm telling you, or asking you, isn't it 
correct that the $80,000 that you had in March of 1997 does not 
show all the dividends that you received from Swanson in 1998 
and 1999, couldn't could it? 
MR. SANDACK: Let me object to the form of question. 
Are you assuming that this is the only account he has? 
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1 MR. DART: No I'm, I'm just assuming that this 
2 account didn't get spent on support because he had other funds 
3 to take care of her support. That's what I've heard his 
4 testimony being. 
5 THE WITNESS: I'm deficient in support. I make 
6 $3,000 a month. I get a return, or adjusted value of $2,500. 
7 I have an obligation of $3,200. I'm not a mathematician, but 
8 that's $1,700 in arrears that has been dealt with for the last 
9 three and a half years and dealt as well as dealing with my own 
10 personal expenses. 
11 Q (BY MR. DART) And the Swanson money's been available 
12 to pay that, has it not? 
13 A Not in large values. You're dealing in large numbers 
14 that are ambiguous and not illustrative of what I've received. 
15 Q Look at 69, look at Exhibit 69 if you would. In 19 -
16 MR. SANDACK: What is 69? Oh. 
17 MR. DART: It's the dividends actually received, not 
18 just income, but actual receipted dividends from Swanson. 
19 Q (BY MR. DART) In 1997, the year of this divorce, you 
20 received $93,000 in dividends, did you not? 
21 A That is not - that is correct. 
22 Q Okay. 
23 A Wait a second, that is not correct. I did receive 
24 that, but they're attributable, there is one here that in 19, 
25 3/19/97 was payment for 1996. I'm sorry, A97. I did not get 
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$93,000 for A98, or '97, I'm sorry. 
Q Those are actual dividend checks to you from Swanson 
that are attached to that exhibit. 
A They are, but they're your exhibit. But they're not 
illustrative of what I received based on the year. 
Q Well, I'm just talking about the date of the check. 
I'm just talking about physical possession of money. You did 
in fact get the money paid, regardless of when it was earned, 
you did get the money in hand as shown on this exhibit. 
A I got it in hand, but there were obligations against 
it, including taxes, sizeable taxes. 
Q Well this, this $80,000 had a balance as of March 
4th, that's Exhibit 67, you had 80,000 in the bank as of March 
4th. That's before any of these dividends were received as 
shown on Exhibit 69 for the 1997 year? 
A That isn't correct. 
Q Well, you got a check in the amount of $37,000 on the 
13th of March. That was 10 days after the statement showing 
$80,000 in your account. 
A Based on your, based on your exhibit. I don't have 
any other -
Q Well all I -
A - I don't have any foundation for that. I don't have 
any bank statements to tell me that's true. 
Q In 1998 you got $93,750 in dividend checks from 
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1 Swanson. 
2 A Okay. 
3 Q In 1990, excuse me, that was the 19, yeah 1998, and 
4 then 1999 you got $84,375 in dividend checks from Swanson. 
5 A All right. 
6 Q And this year to date you've already received over 
7 $40,000 in dividend checks from Swanson? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q So why do you have to dip into that savings account 
10 of $80,000 to pay your obligations for child support? 
11 A This isn't a savings account. It's a checking 
12 account. 
13 Q Well regardless, why did you have to dip into in 
14 order to pay these obligations? 
15 A Because that, because they, every Swanson check was 
16 submitted to that account. I have a $900 bill every month that 
17 I pay for the home. That's $12,000. I have tax obligations. 
18 I have child support obligations which I've made. I have 
19 living expenses. I've noticed in your exhibit a listing of -
20 MR. DART: Your Honor, Your Honor, at this point I'm 
21 going to I'm going to ask the witness again to stop 
22 volunteering. 
23 THE WITNESS: You're asking me a question where the 
24 money went. I'm trying to give you information. 
25 MR. DART: That, again, I submit that when you start 
637 
1 commenting on my exhibits then, then you're beyond that. 
2 THE COURT: Just answer the question that he asked 
3 you. 
4 MR. DART: Thank you, Your Honor. 
5 MR. SANDACK: Excuse me, Your Honor, I'm a little bit 
6 confused. 
7 Counsel, were you suggesting that this is the only 
8 account that those, that those went into? 
9 MR. DART: He's responsible for accounting for all of 
10 his accounts. 
11 MR. SANDACK: Right, and you're not suggesting that, 
12 that he hasn't deposited the checks, are you? 
13 MR. DART: I don't know. I don't know. All I know 
14 is that he didn't need the money, the $80,000, to meet his 
15 ongoing obligations because of all the Swanson dividends that 
16 he's received during the time this divorce action's been 
17 pending. That's, that's the thrust of why, where that 
18 questioning is going to go. 
19 THE COURT: My understanding is that he says he 
20 deposited all those. 
21 MR. SANDACK: That's true. 
22 MR. DART: Your Honor, I would move the entry, by the 
23 way, of Exhibits 61, stipulation filed in this action; 62 which 
24 is his signed reply; and then 76 and 77 which are the 
25 Interrogatory Answers and the, his Affidavit that he signed in 
638 
1 court about the purchase of the stock. 
2 MR. SANDACK: Again so we're protecting the record, 
3 Your Honor, we would object to 61 and 62, or 61 rather. No 
4 objection with respect to the other three. 
5 MR. DART: And 61fs been ruled on as -
6 THE COURT: Yeah, so they're all admitted and 
7 objection is noted. 
8 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 61, 62, 76 and 77 received) 
9 MR. DART: If I just have another, one more minute, 
10 Your Honor. Could I just have one minute? 
11 That's all I have at this time, Your Honor. 
12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. SANDACK: 
14 Q Mr. Chavez, let's see if we can clarify some of these 
15 questions. The exhibit, for whatever purpose it was identified 
16 which I think is 67, apparently only shows the balances in one 
17 account in 1997 and 1998; is that correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And as far as you know, those are correct; is that 
20 correct? 
21 A That is correct. 
22 Q Now you have other accounts, do you not? 
23 A I have two checking accounts. 
24 Q And you have deposited each and every check that 
25 you've ever received at any time throughout the entire history 
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of your marriage and throughout the entire history of your 
separation, have you not? 
A I have. 
Q And you have provided all of those checks and all of 
those statements and all of those deposits to counsel in 
discovery, have you not? 
A I have. 
Q Counsel asked you, started out asking you a question 
about $100,000 that apparently was loaned to Chavez, Inc., and 
you testified about that the other day. That was that paper 
transaction you talked about? 
A That is correct. 
Q They paid you some accruals and retained earnings and 
you turned around and loaned the company back money for, for 
their operating cash, correct? 
A That is, that is correct. 
Q And that occurred at the very end of 1995; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And as I understand the x95 returns for Chavez, Inc., 
demonstrate that there was $100,000 loan at that time that you 
made to them. 
A I did. 
Q And by the end of 1996 that loan was either down to 
$25,000 or had been paid off, one or the other? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q All right. Counsel hasn't demonstrated to you what 
3 your 1996 deposits are, correct? 
4 A No. 
5 Q And as far as you know you've given him all the 
6 deposits you've got and they are accounted for? 
7 A I've given him everything he's asked for. 
8 Q Okay. Getting back into these questions related to 
9 your, or your counsel's statements and reply and the process of 
10 the stipulation and property settlement agreement, is it 
11 correct you, you provided your father's letter dated January 
12 25, I think it was, 1997 which has been listed as Exhibit 63, 
13 you gave that to your counsel, is that correct? 
14 A I, I gave it to him, yes. 
15 Q You heard your father's explanation about that. That 
16 he was angry and simply wanted -
17 MR. DART: Well, Your Honor, if this question is 
18 going to be is your, to characterize his opinion of his 
19 father's testimony, I submit that that's inappropriate. The 
20 question is leading anyway. 
21 MR. SANDACK: Well, Your Honor, these, these are 
22 matters he brought up on his direct, as we had stipulated, and 
23 so to an extent it's cross examination of what he brought up. 
24 Yes, it's leading. I'm simply leading him to the nature of the 
25 conversation. 
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